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PRI VACY RIGHTS V. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
ENFORCEMENT
ROBERT S. PASLEY'
I. INTRODUCTION

There has long been a tension between preserving privacy
rights and concerns and enforcing a strong and effective antimoney laundering effort.2 The legislation in these areas has been
plentiful. However, it has also often been complicated and
controversial. The court cases interpreting the nature and extent
of people's Fourth Amendment privacy rights, as well as the scope
and constitutionality of anti-money laundering laws and
regulations, have not always been consistent or well reasoned. In
addition, because the courts and the legislature have not always
agreed on these issues, some legislation has been passed to
overturn various court decisions, thus, supplanting common
law doctrines with statutory procedures. Finding the right
balance-legislatively and judicially-between the two potentially
competing interests has been difficult. This is particularly
problematic as we implement the latest anti-money laundering
statute, the USA Patriot Act,3 and attempt to improve the security
of our country against international terrorism.
As set forth by the Privacy Protection Study Commission,
the tension between privacy interests and anti-money laundering
efforts represents a long-standing issue: "the balance to be struck
1. Robert S. Pasley is an Assistant Director of the Enforcement and Compliance
Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The %ievis
expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the OCC.
2. Matthew N. KIeiman. Comment, The Riqht to Financial Priracy versus
Computerized Law Enforcement. A New Fiqht in an Old Battle. 8 Nvw. U. L. REV.
1169, 1169 (1992) ("The legal battle between law enforcement and personal privacy
in the United States is as old as privacy law itself.").
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (the acronym being USA Patriot Act). This article vill focus, in part,
on Title III of the Act, known as the International Money Laundering Abatement
and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. See infra 326-350 and accompanying text.
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is an old one; it reflects the tension between individual liberty and
social order. The sovereign needs information to maintain order;
the individual needs to be able to protect his independence and
autonomy should the sovereign overreach." 4
Our rights and interests in privacy are extremely strong and
are anchored in the Constitution. As set forth by Justice Brandeis
in his famous dissent:
The makers of our Constitution... conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.5
This sentiment was echoed by Judge Field, who later became a
Justice of the Supreme Court:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves, not merely protection of his person
from assault, but exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny
of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all
other rights would lose half of their value.6
While privacy interests are highly valued, so are the
interests of being safe and secure from drug trafficking, money
laundering and terrorism. As found by the Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA):
Money Laundering is one of the most critical
problems
facing
law
enforcement
today.
4. Kleiman, supra note 2, at 1169, n.2.

THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY

COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY

346 (1977).

5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. In Re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241,250 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1887).
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International crime probably cannot be controlled
or reduced unless criminal organizations can be
deprived of their illegal proceeds.... Some
minimum level of social and economic costs may
therefore be acceptable in order to strengthen law
enforcement against the threat posed by financial
crime.

In a very insightful comment, relevant to today's post September
11th concerns, the OTA also noted that:
Terrorists, as well as drug traffickers and other
criminal organizations, need to launder money. It
takes money for weapons and explosives. It takes
money to get terrorists to their targets, and then into
hiding. Continuing subversive organizations also
need money for maintaining networks, and for the
support and protection of active members, their
dependents, and their survivors.8
The theme of playing off our privacy rights and interests
against those of anti-money laundering is recurring. As quoted in
the American Banker in 1989, then Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh told a group of bankers and lawyers: "Banks must
play a key role in fighting the nation's drug problem even at the
risk of sacrificing customer privacy.... The most vulnerable point
for any drug operation is at the doorvay to the bank."'

7. UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECH;OLOGY ASSESSMENT,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 119-20, OTA-

ITC-630 (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 1995)
[hereinafter INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES] , available at http:l,,vw.vs.princeton.
edul-otalns20topicj.html (The Office of Technology Assessment closed on Sept. 29,
1995; this Princeton University site catalogs OTA materials) (last %isitedFeb. 27,
2002).
S. Id. at 121.
9. Michael Weinstein, Dng War Justifies Privacy Risks, Thornburgh Says, A!,I.
BANIZER, Oct. 27, 1989, at 1. Echoing this thought, Richard Spillenkothen of the
Federal Reserve System testified recently: "'The Federal Reserve believes that
banking organizations and their employees are the first and strongest line of defense
against financial crimes and, in particular, money laundering." Financial War of
Terrorism and Implementation of Money-Laundering Provisions in the USA Patriot
Act- Hearing Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affiairs Comm., 107th

150

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 6

In addition, news reports point out various mood swings
within the country on the issue:
It was just last spring that the public's wrath over
the proposed "Know Your Customer" (KYC)
regulations made the headlines and caused the
banking agencies to withdraw their long-awaited
proposal.... But this fall, as Congress held hearings
about alleged Russian money laundering, the KYC
proposal has largely been forgotten.... Consumer
privacy is taking a back seat to outrage over the use
of U.S. financial institutions to launder money. The
irony is not lost on the banking industry.1"
More recently, another commentator similarly noted:
The terrorist attacks on America have substantially
changed the issues surrounding financial privacy.
Prior to Sept. 11, privacy advocates were pushing
hard for assurances that banks are respecting the
confidentiality of personal financial information.
Now those advocates are taking a back seat to those
who say government agencies and law enforcement
officials need greater access to financial information
to shore up our national security.... Perhaps the
sacrifice is small considering we are a nation at
war.... Ultimately, bankers will always have to
perform a delicate balancing act which respects the
privacy of customers yet supports the law
enforcement communities' efforts to maintain
national security."
Likewise, a commentator recently claimed: "In the battle of
security versus liberty, security is now winning.... Civil liberties
Cong. (Jan. 29, 2002) (statement of Richard Spillenkothen, Director, Banking
Supervision and Regulation Division, Federal Reserve System).
10. Privacy Crossfire: Money laundering hearings refocus privacy debate, ABA
BANK COMPLIANCE (American Bankers Association), Oct. 1999, at 1-2 (on file with
the N.C. Banking Institute).
11. Tom Bengtson, Focus on privacy has shifted, Nw. FIN. REV., Nov. 15, 2001, at
5, 2001 WL 11575599.
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will no longer be able to stand in the way of the war on
terrorism."' 2
It is wrong, however, to view this delicate balancing issue
in terms of winning or losing, in terms of who is in the driver's seat
and who is "taking a back seat." Assuming the proper balance can
be reached-and, empirically, there should be a place where there
is a proper balance-that balance should not fluctuate based only
on external events. As the Supreme Court noted: "If [the war on
drugs] is to be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of
individuals...., 3 Similarly, in a case from another war, World
War II, Justice Murphy said in a dissent:
At a time when the nation is called upon to give
freely of life and treasure to defend and preserve
the institutions of democracy and freedom, we
should not permit any of the essentials of freedom
to lose vitality through legal interpretations that are
restrictive and inadequate for the period in which
we live.' 4
This article addresses the importance of financial privacy
and anti-money laundering enforcement and the tension between
the two. After first providing a general analysis of the cases
interpreting privacy rights under the Constitution," this article sets
forth a more specific examination of the cases interpreting
financial privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment." Next, this
article analyzes the case law that has interpreted banks' liability
for alleged violations of financial privacy and the Bank Secrecy
Act (BSA)." With this background, this article then addresses the
constitutionality of the BSA and its requirements." Finally, this
article examines the USA Patriot Act and the Right to Financial
Privacy Act in light of our current need for supporting strong anti12. John Heasley, Washington update: Banking agenda changes in the wake of

terrorism,TEX. BANKING, Oct. 1, 2001, at 1, 6. 2001 WL 12352S96.
13. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,439 (1991).
14. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 142 (1942), overrutkd by, Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).
15. See infra notes 20-S9 and accompanying text.
16. See ii fra notes 90-126 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 127-251 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 252-325 and accompanying text.
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money laundering efforts without losing sight of the importance of
financial privacy.'9
II. IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY

Americans value their financial privacy almost more than
any other area. The concern over financial privacy is well-founded
since an analysis of a person's bank account can reveal much about
the individual. As one commentator noted:
Financial information has become such an
important concern because an individual's banking
transactions directly reflect that individual's
lifestyle, personal interests, and political beliefs.
With access to an individual's financial records,
interested parties can easily determine the groups
and associations to which the individual belongs
(e.g., through membership dues or contributions)
and the social causes the individual supports (e.g.,
through contributions). With access to banking
records, interested parties can identify the books
and publications an individual buys (e.g., through
subscription payments or receipts) and the material
items an individual purchases (e.g., through receipts
or credit charges). Prying eyes with access to bank
records can even identify the political party and
causes supported by the individual (e.g., through
contributions to an election campaign or to a
lobbying group).
Financial records further allow interested observers
to recreate a financial "snapshot" of the individual.
Stocks and bonds, insurance, real estate, retirement
funds, cars, homes, personal property, loans,
mortgages, alimony, and child support are all
discoverable from financial records. Credit card
records can trace individuals in their every physical
movement-to different countries, states, or cities,

19. See infra notes 326-422 and accompanying text.
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and even to restaurants, to stores, to airline travel,
and to hotels.2°

These ideas are echoed in court cases:
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by
individuals or business firms of their financial affairs
to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is
impossible to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society without maintaining a bank
account. In the course of such dealings, a depositor
reveals many aspects of his personal affairs,
opinions, habits and associations.
Indeed, the
totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography.2
As Justice Douglas said in a dissent: "the banking transactions of
an individual give a fairly accurate account of his religion,
ideology, opinions, and interests...."- This was later colorfully
reiterated by a lower court: "the message of Mr. Justice Douglas in
[the] Shultz [case] is clear: If it is true that a man is known by the
company he keeps, then his soul is almost laid bare to the
examiner of his checking account. "'
The right to privacy has also been frequently recognized
and upheld by the courts:
That there is such a thing as a constitutionally
protected "right of privacy" has been recognized by
the Supreme Court in such cases as Griswold v.
Connecticut; Katz v. United States, and most
recently in United States v. United States District
24
Court.

20. Keiman, supra note 2,at 1176.
21. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590. 596 (Cal.

1975).
22. California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974).

23. Suburban Trust Co. v. Wailer, 408 A.2d 75S,762 (Md. Ct. Spc. App. 1979).
24. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 124647 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citations
omitted).
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Similarly, there is a long list of statutes designed to protect the
privacy rights and interests of individuals.'
However, people's privacy rights must be balanced against
the need for physical security and effective law enforcement, in
general, and anti-money laundering enforcement specifically.
Anyone who has flown or has even entered a government building
since September 11, 2001 knows how thorough the search for
weapons can be and understands the reasons for it. It is now
common for airlines, through random, enhanced searches, to
examine your carry-on bags and to remove all of your papers from
your briefcase. As always, whenever you pass through Customs,
your person and luggage can be thoroughly searched, and you can
be questioned as to your plans and travel status. And, as noted by
the Supreme Court, in order to support the needs of law
enforcement, providing blood samples, handwriting exemplars and
voice exemplars is not viewed as an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy.26 The Court has even ruled that random highway stops,
without any warrant, suspicion or provocation, in order to check
sobriety or immigration status, are not unconstitutional invasions
of privacy. 27 Given these competing interests between privacy and
law enforcement (and, in particular, anti-money laundering
enforcement), the overriding issue is where the balance should be.
III. IMPORTANCE OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there can be
no doubt that there is a need for strong anti-money laundering
enforcement. As noted even years before this terrorist attack,
"[w]orld stability is increasingly threatened by sophisticated
criminal organizations and their creative implementation of money

25. See L. Richard Fischer, Emerging Issues in the World of FinancialPrivacy,
presentation at Glasser LegalWorks Conference ("Privacy Law After Gramm-Leach
Bliley Act of 1999"), Washington, D.C., May 22-23, 2000, at 2-4 (on file with the N.C.
Banking Institute); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PRIVACY LAWS AND REGULATIONS 3-9 (Sept. 8,
2000), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2000%2D25a.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2002).
26. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,408 (1976).
27. Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,566-67 (1976).
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laundering schemes. "'2S This fact was noted again recently by the
Secretary of the Treasury: "The threat that terrorism poses to the
world financial system demands from us an expanded effort to
combat the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts.-"
Similarly, the need to employ strong anti-money laundering
enforcement efforts was set forth by Under Secretary of the
Treasury Gurule:
Let me begin by saying that criminal acts of
violence, such as the horrific terrorist attacks of
September 11th, need more than just cunning
leadership and dedicated followers to be successful.
Such undertakings also require extensive financial
funding as well ....

Although the complexities of

money laundering have long been associated with
concealing the true nature of proceeds generated
from the drug cartels, the tragedies of September
11th also underscore the need for aggressive and
vigilant anti-money laundering efforts which target
the movement of funds into this country for the
purpose of criminal actiity--especially funds
earmarked for terror."u
As explained by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Dam in recent
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee:
Mr. Chairman, we are engaged in a long-term battle
against illegal abuse of the financial system.
Whether it is terrorist financing or classic narcotics
money laundering, we need to take every measure
possible to combat the evil deeds that soil our
28. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Money Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the

New Regulations Take Effect Will They Help? 14 Dic. J. IWVL, L. 413, 413 (Spring
1996).
29. Paul H. O'Neill, United States Secretary of the Treasury, before The
Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (Oct. 29, 2001 ). at
http:Iusinfo.state.govltopicallpollterrorl01102902.htm (last visited Feb. 26,2002).
30. Domestic and InternationalMoney Laundering: Hearing Before the Senate
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affiairs, 107th Cong. (Sept. 26. 2001)

Commn.

(statement of Jimmy Gurule, United States Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Enforcement), 2001 WL 26186618.
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financial system and pose a real threat to our
security.3
Even prior to the events of September 11th, the threat and
impact of money laundering was clear. In a report from the
United States Department of State, there is the following excellent
explanation of the concerns and consequences associated with
money laundering:
Money laundering is necessitated by the
requirement for criminals, be they drug traffickers,
organized criminals, terrorists, arms traffickers,
blackmailers, or credit card swindlers, to disguise
the origin of their criminal money so that they can
use it more easily....
Money
laundering
has
devastating
social
consequences and is a threat to national security. It
provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, illegal
arms dealers, corrupt public officials and other
criminals to operate and expand their criminal
enterprises....
Unchecked, money laundering can erode the
integrity of a nation's financial institutions....
Ultimately, this laundered money flows into global
financial systems where it could undermine national
economies and currencies. Money laundering is
thus not only a law enforcement problem but poses
a serious national and international security threat
as well....
Money
launderers
also
negatively
impact
jurisdictions by reducing tax revenues through
31. Financial War on Terrorism and Implementation of Money-Laundering
Provisions in the USA Patriot Act. Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2002) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam,
United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Kenneth W. Dam
Testimony], at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ebanking/O2_Olhrgl12902/dam.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2002).
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underground economies, competing unfairly with
legitimate businesses, damaging financial systems,
and disrupting economic development.... Fighting
money launderers not only reduces financial crime;
it also deprives criminals and terrorists of the means
to commit other serious crimes.' Many of these thoughts and concerns were the foundation
of the Department of Treasury's and the Department of Justice's
joint 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy:
The 2001 [National Money Laundering] Strategy

recognizes that money laundering is an integral
component of large-scale criminal enterprises. Drug
trafficking, firearms smuggling, international bank
and securities frauds, bribery, intellectual property
theft, and other specified unlawful activity generate
illicit proceeds that criminals must conceal.... Once
criminals successfully disguise their illicit proceeds,
they then can reinvest them in their criminal
organizations, expand their operations, and profit
from their crimes.33
It should also be noted that the economic costs alone of
money laundering have consistently been estimated in
phenomenal amounts:
In 1996, the United Nations estimated that US $1
billion daily was involved in money laundering. The
Commercial Crime Bureau of the International
Chamber of Commerce believe this figure to be
greatly understated.'
32. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES,

availableat w.,wv.state.gov/ginlIrlsfnrcrptt2000iO59.htm (last xisited Feb. 26, 2f02).
33. PAUL O'NEILL & JOHN ASHCROFT, FORENWARD TO U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, OFFIcE OF ENFORCEMENT, THE 2001 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING

STRATEGY (Sept. 2001), at http:llv,,,,N..ustreas.ovprss!releass!doz!m-!C.pdf

(last visited Feb. 27,2002).
34. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO THE PREVENTIO

OF

MoNEY LAUNDERING, JOURNAL OF COMERCE 4 (June, 1993 (on file vith the N.C.

Banking Institute).
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Despite increasing international attention and
stronger anti-money laundering controls, some
current estimates are that $500 billion to $1 trillion
in criminal proceeds are laundered through banks
worldwide each year, with about half of that amount
moved through United States banks.35
For example, former IMF Managing Director
Michael Camdessus estimated the global volume of
laundering at between two and five percent of the
world's gross domestic product, a range which
encompasses sums between $600 billion and $1.8
trillion.36
With regard to terrorism alone, the amount of money involved is
surprisingly large. As Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Dam
testified: "Since September 11th, the United States and other
countries have frozen more than $80 million in terrorist-related
3
assets. , 1
As evident from these concerns, problems, and
consequences related to it, money laundering is a very serious
matter that needs to be addressed through strong measures. To
demonstrate how enforcement efforts interact with individual
privacy rights and concerns, it is useful to explore the case law
pertaining to privacy rights in general and privacy rights as they
specifically relate to financial records.

35. PrivateBanking and Money Laundering:A Case Study of Opportunities and
Vulnerabilities: HearingBefore the Senate PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations,
106th Cong. 428 (Nov. 1999) (opening statement of Senator Carl Levin), available at
http://Ilevin.senate.gov/floor/110999.htm.

36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, THE
2001 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, at ix, n.2 (Sept. 2001) at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases.docs/ml200l.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,2002).
37. Kenneth W. Dam Testimony, supra note 31. Financial War on Terrorism and
Implementation of Money-Laundering Provisions in the USA PatriotAct: Hearing of
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2002)
(statement of Kenneth W. Dam, United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury),
available at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ebanking/O20O1hrg/012902/dam.htm
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2002).
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CASES INTERPRETING PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The cases interpreting the scope of an individual's privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment have been varied and even
contradictory.
In a seminal Fourth Amendment case that came before the
Supreme Court, Olmstead v. United States, the plaintiffs
complained that the police had unlawfully and unconstitutionally
wiretapped their phones. 9 In fact, the police had wiretapped eight
phones over a period of five months.4
The government
acknowledged that it had not obtained a search warrant for the
wiretapping and that the wiretapping was illegal under state law,
but contended that the illegally obtained evidence should be
admitted anyavay.' The Court ageed. 2
The case involved "a conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act by unlawfully possessing, transporting...
importing [and selling] intoxicating liquors."4' - It was a conspiracy
of "amazing magnitude" that had "two seagoing vessels"' and
employed over 50 people, including "executives, salesmen,
deliveryinen, dispatchers, scouts, booldeepers, collectors and an
attorney.""5 The enterprise moved 200 cases of liquor per day and
had annual sales in excess of $2 million.4
It does not appear, however, that the Court was concerned
about the size or seriousness of the conspiracy. Rather, the Court
simply focused on an overly restrictive interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment premised primarily on the historical tests of whether
a particular place or area had been invaded.47 The wiretaps, which
apparently provided the necessary evidence for the convictions,
did not involve a physical entry into the plaintiffs' houses or
offices. Instead, as the Court emphasized, the wiretaps were made
38.
39.
40.
41.
4243.
44.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 L192 ).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 466, 468.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 455.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455-56.

45. Id. at 456.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 461-65.
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"in the basement of large office buildings and along the streets
near the houses."48 According to the Court, the "well known
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment... was to prevent
the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his person,
his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his
will."4 9 In this case, according to the Court, there was no entry, 50
there was no trespass,5 1 there was no searching," and there was no
seizure." In addition, the Court was struck by the fact that the
"evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
54
only.
The Court, in upholding the Government's illegal
wiretapping, held that: "the language of the Amendment can not
be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to
the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The
intervening wires are not part of his house or office any more than
are the highways along which they are stretched."55
Given the fact that the Government had not searched the
plaintiffs' "person, house, papers or effects," there was no
unconstitutional search and seizure.56
This case, decided on a 5-4 basis, motivated Justice
Brandeis to deliver a scathing and memorable dissent. He
emphasized the fact that the police had wiretapped eight
telephones over a five month period, and that, in installing the
wiretaps, the police had not only committed misdemeanors, but
also had caused an employee of the phone company to do so as
well.57 Thus, he concluded his dissent with the following
admonition:

48.
49.
50.
51.
5253.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 457.
Id. at 463.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. The fact that the wiretapping was also illegal

under state law was, according to the Court, not a "valid objection" to its
admissibility. Id. at 466-67.
57. Id. at 471, 479-80 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution.-"
During the course of his dissent, Brandeis correctly noted
that it was immaterial where the physical connection of the

wiretapping occurred; 59 thus undermining the basic tenet of the

majority decision. Citing to an old English case, he explained:
It is not the brealdng of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offense .... "
By analogy, Brandeis pointed out the fact that a letter
which is mailed through the postal system is protected by the
Fourth Amendment even though it travels outside of the house."'
He reasoned that there should be -no difference between the
sealed letter and the private telephone message.""' In quoting the
lower court decision, Brandeis reiterated that: "true the one is
visible, the other invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible;
the one is sealed and the other unsealed, but these are distinctions
without a difference."6'3
He went on to note that wiretapping a phone was actually
far more invasive than opening a letter, because the former affects
58. Id. at 485.
59. Id. at 479.

60. Id. at 474-75 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Hobl's State Trials, 1030.
1066).
61. Id. at 475 (citing Exparte Jackson, 99 U.S. 727 (1S77)).
62. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475.
63. Id.
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all calls and all parties to the call. 64 Bothered by this intrusiveness,
Brandeis speculated that:
The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home."
While this insight into the possible future has not come to pass,
there are, obviously, many things that go on within a house that
can be revealed, such as what is sent or ordered via computer,
what is ordered via pay TV, and even what is communicated via
on-line banking.
Similarly to Olmstead, in Goldman v. United States, 66 the
Court's decision set forth a similarly restrictive view of people's
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. 67 In this case, the
Petitioners were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy
Act. 68 The conspiracy involved undervaluing the assets of the
person in bankruptcy, selling the assets at market value, and
keeping the difference. 69 The plan was devised by two attorneys,
Goldman and Shulman, and was proposed to a third attorney, who
ostensibly agreed to the plan, but, in fact, cooperated with the
authorities from the outset.7" In an effort to build a case against
the first two attorneys, a meeting in Shulman's office was arranged
between all three attorneys.7' With the help of a building
superintendent, the federal agents on the case gained access to
Shulman's office and planted a listening device. 72 However, when
the time came for the meeting, the planted listening device did not
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 474.
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131.
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work and the agents resorted to using a sensitive listening device
by which they could overhear the lawyers' conversation from an
adjoining office.7'
The petitioners, in support of their motion to suppress the
evidence, tried to distinguish Olmstead by arguing that their
conversation did not go outside of the room.' In rejecting this
Fourth Amendment argument, the Court, in another 5-4 decision,
reasoned as follows:
It is urged that where, as in the present case, one
talks in his own office, and intends his conversation
to be confined within the four walls of the room, he
does not intend his voice shall go beyond those walls
and it is not to be assumed he takes the risk of
someone's use of a delicate detector in the next
room. We think, however, the distinction is too nice
for practical application of the Constitutional
guarantee, and no reasonable or logical distinction
can be drawn between what federal agents did in the
present
case and state officers did in the Olmstead
75
case.

It would appear, however, that it was the Court's ovm "'nice"
distinctions in Olmstead and Goldman that disturbed the dissent:
There was no physical entry in this case. But the
search of one's home or office no longer requires
physical entry, for science has brought forth far
more effective devices for the invasion of a person's
privacy than the direct and obvious methods of
oppression which were detested by our forebears
and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.7
What is curious about Goldman is not just the Court's
artificial and strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, but
also the fact that there was, in fact, a "physical entry in this case."
73. Id. at 131-32.

74. Id. at 135.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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The only trouble was that that process failed." If the Government
had not been forced to resort to "Plan B" and use a sensitive
listening device placed on the wall of the adjoining office," there
probably would have been no question as to the existence of a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In any event, in the next major Fourth Amendment privacy
case, the Supreme Court overturned its earlier decisions in the
Olmstead and Goldman cases.7 9 In this case, Katz v. United States,
the authorities had placed a wiretap in an outside public pay
telephone booth. 0 The government, in trying to defend the
warrantless search, stressed - apparently with a straight face - "the
fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his
calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after
'
he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside."'
However, as the Court correctly pointed out: "[what the
Petitioner] sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where
he might be seen."8 2
In rejecting the Olmstead and Goldman restrictive
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that was focused on
whether there had been a physical entry, the Court in Katz
established a new doctrine that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places."8 3 Even though, as the Court found, the agents
in Katz had acted with restraint, such self-imposed restraint could
not take the place of a prior judicial review of the action in order
to protect people's rights under the Fourth Amendment:
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with
restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 131.
Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 352.
Id.

83. Id. at 351. However, it should be noted that the Court, while making this
pronouncement, nonetheless stressed the importance of the place: "One who
occupies [a public pay telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id. at 352.
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restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not
by a judicial officer. They were not required, before
commencing the search, to present their estimate of
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral
magistrate. They were not compelled, during the
conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits
established in advance by a specific court order.
Nor were they directed, after the search had been
completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in
detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of
such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least
intrusive means consistent with that end.'4
Following the reasoning in Katz, the Court in Mancusi v.
DeForte5 ruled that an officer in a union had a "reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion" and that a
warrantless search of his office on the premises of the union was
protected.s6 Many other cases have also cited favorably to Katz,
including such famous decisions as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of NarcoticsS7 (specifically echoing
the fact that, pursuant to Katz, "the Fourth Amendment is not tied
to the niceties of local trespass laws""3), and Roe v. Wade." This
line of cases clearly established a right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.
V. CASES INTERPRETING FINANCIAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Similar to the cases interpreting the scope of Fourth

Amendment privacy rights in general, the cases analyzing the
rights of banking customers and the extent of their financial
84. Id. at 356-57.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

392 U.S. 364 (1968).
Id. at 368,372.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 393-94.
410 U.S. 113,152 (1973).
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privacy protections have fluctuated on this controversial issue.
Unlike the general privacy rights cases, though, those dealing with
financial privacy eventually came to a different result. 90
In Fisher,9' the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a summons requiring an attorney to produce work papers that
had been created by his clients' accountant and that had been
delivered by the clients to the attorney.92 In reviewing the
applicability of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the facts of
the case, the Court noted that "[i]t is true that the Court has often
stated that one of the several purposes served by the constitutional
privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination is that of
protecting personal privacy."'93 However, the Court further noted
that "[i]t is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of
incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is
incriminating." 94
In upholding the forced production of an accountant's work
papers that were not created by the clients, that were not in the
clients' possession, and that were testimonial in nature, the Court's
decision was not remarkable. 95 However, in his concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan provided an interesting, but inconclusive,
discussion of the privacy of financial records:
Nonbusiness economic records in the possession of
an individual, such as cancelled checks or tax
records, would also seem to be protected. They may
provide clear insights into a person's total lifestyle.
They are, however, like business records and the
papers involved in these cases, frequently, though
not always, disclosed to other parties; and
disclosure, in proper cases, may foreclose reliance
upon the privilege. 96
90. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
91. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
92. Id. at 394. It appears that there may have been some effort on the part of the
lawyer and his clients to hide the documents in question. Id.
93. Id. at 399.
94. Id. at 408 (emphasis in the original).
95. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
96. Fisher,425 U.S. 391,427 (1976).
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It is difficult to determine from this quote where the Court,
or even Brennan, was going. The quote is sprinkled too much with
phrases such as "seem to be protected" and "may foreclose
reliance upon the privilege" to provide any clear guidance.
However, the direction of the Court in this area was resolved-at
least for the time-by its decision in United States v. Miller, which
was handed down on the same day as Fisher.
In Miller, the Court ruled directly on the issue of what
financial confidentiality a bank customer could expect. In that
case, a fire had broken out in a warehouse being rented by Mr.
Miller. The responding firemen and sheriff department found a
"7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax paid
whiskey, and related paraphernalia.""
In the course of investigating the matter further, the
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of the U.S. Treasury
Department issued a defective subpoena to Mr. Miller's banks,
which complied with the subpoena." Mr. Miller was subsequently
convicted of "possessing an unregistered still, carrying on the
business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to
defraud the Government of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of
whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to
defraud the United States of tax revenues."' ' Mr. Miller moved
to suppress the banking records, which apparently supported the
tax charges.'
In ruling that the district court properly denied the motion
to suppress, the Court held that the "respondent had no
protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed
documents."'0 2 In relying on an earlier case (and apparently
ignoring the more recent Katz case that held that even a restrained
search that involved no "entry" was not permissible under the
Fourth Amendment if it were not sanctioned in advance by a
court), 3 the Court seemed to hark back to the Olmstead and
97. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
98. Id. at 437.

99. Id. at 437-39. The subpoena was signed by a United States Attorney, but not
by a court. Id.

100. Id. at 436.
101. Id.

102. Id. at 437.
103. Katz v. United States. 3S9 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Goldman line of cases, which required an "intrusion" before
finding that the Fourth Amendment is triggered:
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-302
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately
protected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated
by governmental investigative activities unless there
is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into "the
security a man relies upon when he places himself or
his property
within a constitutionally protected
4
10

area."'

The Court further held that the customer's bank documents were
neither private nor confidential and were not protected by the
Fourth Amendment:
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are
not respondent's "private papers"... respondent
can assert neither ownership nor possession.
Instead, these are the business records of the banks.
Even if we direct our attention to the original
checks and deposit slips, rather than to the
microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by
means of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate
"expectation of privacy" in their contents. The
checks are not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.
All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to
the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business. The lack of any
legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the
information kept in bank records was assumed by
Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the
expressed purpose of which is to require records to
104. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). It is curious that the majority decision did
not even reference the Katz case at this point in the case. Subsequently, the Court
"distinguished" away the Katz case by simply holding that there is no "legitimate

'expectation of privacy' in the bank records. Id. at 442.
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be maintained because they "have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings."' "5

Justice Brennan, who filed the ambiguous concurring
opinion in Fisher, 6 as set forth above, issued a strong dissent in
Miller. 7 In his dissent, he relied, in part, on the fact that the
California Constitution had a provision that was virtually identical
to the language of the Fourth Amendment'B that had been
interpreted, in Burrows,0 9 to protect bank records:
The California Supreme Court held that the accused
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank
statements and records, that the voluntary
relinquishment of such records by the bank at the
request of the sheriff and prosecutor did not
constitute a valid consent by the accused, and that
the acquisition by officers of the records therefore
was the result of an illegal search and seizure. In my
view the same conclusion, for the reasons stated by
the California Supreme Court, is compelled in this
case under the practically identical phrasing of the
Fourth Amendment. 10
The majority in Miller attempted to distinguish Burrows by
noting that there was no subpoena in that case and that the bank
had provided the records voluntarily:
This case differs from Burrows v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590 (1974), relied on by Mr.
Justice Brennan in dissent, in that the bank records
of respondent's accounts were furnished in response
105. Id. at 440-43.

106. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,414-30(1976).
107. Miller,425 U.S. at 447-55.

108. Id. at 447. The only difference between the tvuo provisions is that the
California Constitution says "unreasonable seizures and searches" and the Fourth
Amendment, of course, says "unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
109. Burrow~s v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal.
1975).
110. Miller,425 U.S. at 448.
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to "compulsion by legal process" in the form of
subpoenas duces tecum. The court in Burrows
found it "significant... that the bank [in that case]
provided the statements to the police in response to
an informal oral request for information..'
This is all well and good, except for the fact that the subpoena
issued in Miller was, by all accounts, defective and that the bank,
from a legal perspective, had also voluntarily handed over the
documents. 12
In Burrows, a lawyer was suspected of having
misappropriated the funds of a client." 3 The detective on the case
had contacted several banks and, without a warrant, had obtained
copies of the lawyer's bank statements." 4 In ruling that this was
inappropriate, the court held that:
A bank customer's reasonable expectation is that,
absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he
reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only
for internal banking purposes.... Instead, it is
argued [by the People], banks have an independent
interest in voluntarily cooperating with law
enforcement officers because financial institutions
desire to foster a favorable public image, and like
any good citizen, to assist in the detection of crime.
However laudable these motives may be, we are not
here concerned with the conduct or reputation of
111. Id.at 445 n.7.
112. Id. at 439 ("The subpoenas issued here were found not to constitute adequate
'legal process.' The fact that the bank officers cooperated voluntarily.. . "); id. at 450
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (citing the Burrows' case description of the lower court
Miller decision).
The circuit court.., held that the defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment were violated by the search because the
subpoena was issued by the United States Attorney rather than by

a court or grand jury, and the bank's voluntary compliance with
the subpoena was irrelevant since it was the depositor's right to
privacy which was threatened by the disclosure.
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
113. Burrows, 529 P.2d at 591.
114. Id.
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banks, but with whether the police violated
petitioner's rights by obtaining from banks, without
legal process, documents in which petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy."'
To permit a police officer access to these records
merely upon his request, without any judicial
control as to relevancy or other traditional
requirements of legal process.., opens the door to
a vast and unlimited range of very real abuses of
police power.
Cases are legion that condemn violent searches and
invasions of an individual's right to the privacy of
his dwelling. The imposition upon privacy, although
perhaps not so dramatic, may be equally
devastating
6
employed."
are
methods
other
when
The argument advanced by the People in Burrows that there was
no search and seizure because the "bank voluntarily provided the
statements to the police, and the bank rather than the
police
7
conducted the search of its records..

." fell

on deaf ears."

Interestingly, the Burrows court relied on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Miller before that case was overturned by the
Supreme Court."' In addition, contrary to the Supreme Court
decision in Miller to the effect that there was "no legitimate
'expectation of privacy' in bank records,"" in part due to the
passage of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),"" the Burrows court held
that the BSA did not conflict with a holding requiring the issuance
of a subpoena:
In California Bankers Association v. Shultz, [an]

association of bankers, a bank, and some of its
115. Id. at 593.
116. Id. at 596.
117. Id. at 595.

118. Id. at 594.
119. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976).
120. Id. at 442-43. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-503,

04

Stat.

1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959; 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002; 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5355).
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customers challenged the validity of the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970.... The United States Supreme
Court held, in a six-three decision, that the bank's
rights under the Fourth Amendment were not
abridged by the regulation.... Miller [the Fifth
Circuit's decision] holds that Shultz may not be
interpreted as "proclaiming open season on
personal bank records" or as permitting the
government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment
by first requiring banks to copy their depositors'
checks and then calling upon the banks to allow
inspection of those copies without appropriate legal
21
process.
As noted, one of the basic underpinnings of Miller was its
interpretation of the privacy effect of the BSA in holding that,
because Congress, through the Act, required banks to keep certain
records, there could be no expectation of privacy. 22 Congress
disagreed and responded to this non sequitur by passing the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA). j 23 As set forth in the
House Report on the legislation:
The [RFPA] is a congressional response to the
Supreme Court decision in the United States v.
Miller which held that a customer of a financial
institution has no standing under the Constitution to
contest Government access of financial records.
The Court did not acknowledge the sensitive nature
121. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590, 595-96

(Cal. 1975).
122. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the

information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in
enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is
to require records to be maintained because they 'have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations
and proceedings.

Id.
123. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641,
3697-710 (1978) (codified, as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422); see also H.R. REP.
No. 95-1383, at 34 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306.
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of these records, and instead decided that since the
records are the "property" of the financial
institution, the customer has no constitutionally
recognizable privacy interest in them.
Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court found no
constitutional right of privacy in financial records, it
is clear that Congress may provide protection of
individual rights beyond that afforded in the
Constitution.' 24
Once the RFPA was passed, it more or less controlled the
issue of when and how financial records could be disseminated to
the federal government. As a result, there are relatively few other
cases that have reviewed this topic. However, given the fact that
Miller went against the lower court precedent,' that it could be
viewed as being contrary to Katz, that it relied on a flawed
interpretation of Burrows,12 6 and that Congress so strongly
disagreed with the outcome, one has to wonder if Miller would
have stayed good law if the RFPA had not been passed to
statutorily occupy the area. Regardless, the RFPA, as discussed
below, has brought some certainty to the issue of when and how a
bank can hand records over to law enforcement authorities.
VI. CASES INTERPRETING BANKS' LIABILITY FOR ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY

AND THE BSA SAFE HARBOR

While the cases mentioned above discuss privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment and, specifically, financial privacy,
it is important to also explore the historic liability on the part of a
bank that discloses its customers' account information and
arguably violates the customers' privacy. The first two cases deal
with a bank's disclosure to a customer's employer, while the
remaining pertain to disclosures to law enforcement authorities.

124. Id.
125. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation of lower court
decision).
126. Burrows, 529 P.2d at 590.
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The seminal right-to-privacy case in financial matters is a
relatively old English case, Tournier v. National Provincial and
Union Bank of England.127 The plaintiff in this case was
overdrawn at his bank by nine pounds, eight shillings. He
promised to pay off the overdraft in increments of one pound a
week, but, after three weeks, failed to make good on his promise.
Subsequently, the bank noted that Tournier had received a check
made out to him in the amount of forty-five pounds and that he
had endorsed the check over to a Mr. Lloyd. The bank became
aware of the check because it was drawn on the account of one of
the bank's other customers. When the bank noticed that Tournier
had endorsed the check over to Mr. Lloyd instead of using it to
pay off his overdraft, the bank called Mr. Lloyd's bank and was
told that he was a "bookmaker."' 12' The bank then called
Tournier's employer to find a current address for Tournier. In
response to questions from the employer, the bank disclosed the
fact that Tournier was overdrawn at the bank and stated that: "As
we have been able to trace a cheque or cheques to a bookmaker
we are afraid he is mixed up with bookmakers.',12 9 Shortly
thereafter, Tournier's employment contract was not renewed,
although it is unclear whether this event was due to the bank's
unfavorable disclosure or, as the jury
found, the fact that the
' 30
brisk."'
not
"was
business
company's
Each of the three judges hearing the case on appeal ruled,
in separate decisions, that there was, "as a matter of law," no
"absolute contract" of confidentiality.' 31 Instead, they held that "it
was an implied term of the contract between the plaintiff and the
bank that they would not disclose to anyone any of the plaintiff's
business with the bank or matters arising therefrom, or the nature
'
or state of his account, or any transactions relating thereto."332
127. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461 (1923);
see Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758,762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
128. Tournier,1 K.B. at 461.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. This holding was in spite of the fact that the bank had written on
Tournier's passbook, as well as on those of all its customers: "The officers of the
Bank are bound to secrecy as regards the transactions of its customers." Id.

132- Id. Curiously, though, one judge suggested that the disclosure that Tournier
had endorsed over a check to a bookmaker might not be protected since that piece of

information did not result from any activity in Tournier's account, but rather in
another customer's account. Id.
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The contract, though, according to the court, was a qualified one
that had the following exceptions:
(1) Where the disclosure is under compulsion by
law.
(2) Where there is a duty to the public to disclose.
(3) Where the interests of the bank require
disclosure.
(4) Where the disclosure is made by the express or
implied consent of the customer.3

This four-part test controlled many subsequent court cases. In
Peterson,1- however, the court used a different formula.'
The
facts of this case were actually quite similar to Tournier. In
Peterson, the managing officer of a company had approached the
bank and had asked the bank to tell him if any of the company's
employees "might be doing anything that might bring discredit to
the company."' 3 6 Subsequently, an officer of the bank wrote a
letter to the company's managing officer saying: "the personal
finances of your local representative have deteriorated to the point
where much unfavorable criticism is being voiced. We have
returned a large number of checks for not sufficient funds, and I
fear that some of the holders of these checks could take legal
action."' 37 The officer later showed the managing officer the
plaintiff's actual accounts" 3
In reviewing the facts of the case, the court applied the
following four-part test for privacy, without even referring to
Tournier

(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs.
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff.

133. Id.

134. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961).
135. Id. at 287; see infra note 139 and accompanying text.

136. Id. at 286.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye.
(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage,
139
likeness.
or
name
plaintiff's
the
of
In spite of the apparent applicability of the first two tests, the court
held-with very little discussion-that there was no violation or
breach of privacy because the bank account information was not
disclosed to the public-just to the employer. 4 This, the court
held, was not enough to satisfy the requirements of the privacy
tests. 141
Although the court refused to find an invasion of privacy, it
held that there was an agency relationship between the bank and
the customer and that, according to the Restatement of Law of
Agency, the bank had "a duty to the [customer] not to use or
communicate information confidentially given him by the
[customer]., 142 Accordingly, the court found that there was an
implied contract between the bank and the customer that the bank
breached:
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its
customer or depositor that no information may be
disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning
the customer's or depositor's account, and that,
unless authorized by law or by the customer or
depositor, the bank must
be held liable for breach of
43
the implied contract.
What is fascinating here is that although the court specifically and
emphatically rejected the violation of privacy claim and, instead,
relied on an agency theory, coupled with an implied contract
theory, the court also referenced as applicable the people's Fourth

139. Id. at 287. Instead of setting forth a list of exceptions to the general rule of

privacy, the Peterson court tried to articulate an actual rule for privacy.
140. Peterson,367 P.2d at 288.
141. Id. The decision, though, failed to discuss the possible applicability of the first

test, which, as the court spelled out, did not "depend upon publicity." Id. at 287.
142. Id. at 289-90; see also, Dr. John Breslin, Privacy - the Civil Liberties Issue, 14
DICK. J. INT'L. L. 455, 459-60 (1996).

143. Peterson,367 P.2d at 290.
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Amendment right to be secure in their papers," as well as a state
statute that protected "'the sanctity of the privacy of bank
accounts."' 45 However, the court completely neglected to discuss
or analyze the applicability of either the Fourth Amendment or
the state statute to the case.

4 the facts
In the case of Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller,"'
were very straight-forward, yet produced a complicated result. In
this case, Mr. Waller deposited $800 in cash into an account that
he had opened only the previous month.'
His companion
deposited an identical amount in an account he had just opened
that same day."S The cash they deposited consisted of sequentially
numbered fifty and one hundred dollar bills.'" The tellers
handling the transaction brought the deposits to the attention of
the bank's security officer." He, in turn, contacted the local law,
enforcement authorities and learned that there had been a recent
robbery in the area in which $3,000 in fifty and one hundred dollar
bills had been taken. 5' In addition, the description that the
authorities gave of the suspects generally matched the description
of the bank's two customers.1 2 When the security officer vas told
this information, he became even more suspicious of the two
customers and, understandably and properly, disclosed their
identity to the authorities.' The victim later identified Waller as
one of the suspects and, on that basis, he was arrested.'Y4
As it turned out, Waller apparently did not commit the
"'
crime. 55
He had received a tax refund check for an undisclosed

amount,'5- and when he went to cash it at the bank, he was

rebuffed because he did not have enough collected funds in his

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 2S9.
Id. at 290.
Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
Id. at 760.

148. Id.

149. Id.
150. Id. at 760-61.
151. Id. at 761.
152. Suburban Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 761.
153. Id.

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 760.
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account to cover the check. 157 He then physically took the check
to the Treasury Department where he got the check cashed,
apparently with newly minted money,
and returned to the bank to
58
deposit at least some of that money.1
After the charges were dismissed, Waller sued the bank for
invasion of privacy and breach of an implied contract. 5 9 The trial
court issued a direct verdict against Waller on the invasion of
privacy claim, but issued a directed verdict in his favor on the issue
60
of the bank's liability on the breach of implied contract count.
The judge allowed only the issue of damages to go to the jury,
which awarded Waller $50,000 in compensatory damages.16' The
bank appealed the verdict on three grounds:
(1) The bank's limited disclosure of account related
information to the police was reasonable.
(2) The bank's actions were not the proximate cause
of Waller's damages.
(3) There was inadequate62 evidence as to Waller's
alleged loss of reputation.1
The appellate court, in ruling on the case, relied on Tournier to
hold: "Courts have recognized the special considerations inherent
in the bank-depositor relationship and have not hesitated to find
that a bank implicitly warrants to maintain, in strict confidence,
information regarding its depositor's affairs.' 63
The court also quoted Peterson with favor, but failed to do
so in a way that indicated that there was a balancing of any kind to
perform.' 64 Instead, the court quoted only the following section
from Peterson:

157. Id. Why any bank would require a customer to "cover" a Government issued
tax refund check is unclear, unless the bank thought that the check was stolen or
fraudulent.
158. Suburban Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 760.
159. Id. at 761.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 760-61.
162. Id. at 761.
163. Id. at 762.
164. Suburban Trust Co., 408 A.2d. at 763.
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It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time
consider itself at liberty to disclose the intimate
details of its depositors' accounts. Inviolate secrecy
is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of
the relationship of the bank and its customers or
depositors....
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its
customer or depositor that no information may be
disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning
the customer's or depositor's account ....

In fact, the Peterson court held that the contract between the
banker and the customer was contingent on the bank's "duty of
disclosure."' 66 This is the same duty that the court in Indiana
National Bank v. Chapman,67 ruled did require a disclosure to law
enforcement authorities.6
Reflecting its rigidity, the Suburban court rejected the four
part test of Tournieron the grounds that it conferred "upon a bank
entirely too much discretion."'"' The court's decision, though,
seems to have swung completely the other way. To bolster its
holding, the court quoted with favor a state law, which was not yet
in effect at the time of the events of this case, for the proposition
that "banks may not, absent legal compulsion or express or
implied authorization from the depositor concerned, reveal any
information to any one, including police and other government
agencies, about the depositor's dealings with the bank."""°
Unfortunately, the overly glib court 7 ' refused to even
consider the reasonableness of the bank's action and upheld the
lower court's determination of the bank's liability on a directed
verdict without any discussion of the proximate cause issue. In this
165. Id. (citing Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 2,4, 290 (1%1)).
166. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 200 (Idaho 1961).
167. Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1935).
168. Id. at 482; see also Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, 728 F. Supp.
1551,1566 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
169. Suburban Trust Co., 408 A.2d 758,764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
170. Id. at 765. See Breslin, supra note 142, at 462.
171. Throughout the decision, the court made unnecessary sarcastic remarks and
used colloquialisms that it took pains to explain in footnotes. See generally Suburban
Trust Co., 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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regard, it is hard to accept the notion that, as a matter of law, a
bank can be held responsible for an arrest that was a governmental
decision and action based on the positive identification by the
victim.'
Subsequent courts have disagreed with the Suburban
decision in general and on this point of proximate cause
specifically, as discussed later.'73
The holding in Suburban, of course, does not represent the
state of the law today. Pursuant to various regulations,' a bank
must report suspicious activity, which is clearly all that the bank in
this case did. Furthermore, a bank is now protected by a "safe
harbor,"'75 as discussed below.
One of the cases to disagree with the Suburban decision
was Indiana National Bank v. Chapman.'7 6 In that case, the State
Police were investigating Chapman for possible arson and
insurance fraud stemming from the discovery of his car,
abandoned and burned out. 17 7 The officer in charge of the
investigation, Sergeant York, contacted the bank where Chapman
had his car loan and was told that the car had been slated for
repossession at one time, due to late payments.' As it turned out,
however, there was a dispute over the payments, and, apparently,
Chapman
had only been minimally late with his payments, if
9
ever.

17

Chapman was charged with arson, but when the evidence
against him did not pan out, the prosecutor moved for the charges

172. Id. Ironically, the court actually relented on the bank's third claim to the
effect that there was, in the words of the court, "no evidence that Waller's reputation

was damaged." Id. at 766. Since the District Court had ruled out the possibility of
punitive damages and that holding had not been appealed, it would seem that the
case should have been dismissed in favor of the bank. However, the court sent the
case back down to be tried all over again. Id.
173. Ind. Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985); Stoutt
v. Banco Popular de P.R., 158 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Puerto Rico 2001).
174. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2001); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11

(2001).
175. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (1994). While the reporting requirements entail a
dollar threshold for non-insiders, the safe harbor protects the banks for even
voluntary reporting.
176. Ind.Nat'l Bank, 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985).
177. Id. at 476.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 476-77.
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to be dismissed."' 0 Subsequently, Chapman sued the bank and was

awarded almost $90,0002"5
In reviewing the case on appeal, the court held that the
bank was entitled to respond to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry and, as such, had a qualified privilege to the normal rule
that a banker should not divulge bank-related information without
the consent of the customer: 2 "[w]e hold a bank impliedly
contracts only that it will not reveal a customer's financial status
unless a public duty arises. Communication to legitimate law
enforcement inquiry meets the public duty test."' 3
The court also relied on relevant state law to support its
reasoning: "[t]he Indiana law of privacy recognizes an invasion
only if the matter is not of public concern, and case law in our state
indicates that a person does not legitimately expect his affairs with
third parties to be kept private
from law enforcement officers
'1 4
investigation."'
an
conducting
In another case, Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa National
Bank, 5 the plaintiffs went to the bank in order to redeem two

certificates of deposit and to make a large cash withdrawal so they
could transport the funds to Mexico and take advantage of higher
interest rates that existed in that country at that time.' However,
when they were informed that a Currency Transaction Report
(CTR)would have to be filed, they revised their requests so that
they left the bank with less than $10,000 in cashY The bank
suspected the couple of attempting to engage in structuring, in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324,"' and, accordingly, filed a Criminal
Referral Form. 5 9 Even though the husband later pled guilty to

structuring, making false statements, and causing the bank to fail
180. Id. at 447.

18. Id. at 476.
182. Id.Nat'l Bank, 482 N.E.2d. at 478,480-82.

183. Id. at 482. In reaching this holding, the court specifically rejected the
Suburban Trust rule and implicitly adopted the second privacy exemption set forth in
the Tournier case: "where there is a duty to the public to disclose." Tournier v. Nat'l
Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461 (1923).
184. Id.

185. Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa National Bank, 896 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D.
Tex. 1995).
186. Id. at 1418.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1418-19.

189. Id.
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to file a CTR, the couple nonetheless brought suit against the bank
for violations of the RFPA, state law, their Fourth Amendment
' 90
rights to privacy, and an implied "condition of confidentiality.'
In granting the bank's motion for summary judgment,' 9 ' the
court held first that the RFPA did not apply because the bank's
disclosures were compelled by federal law.' 9z Second, in denying
the other claims, the court noted that "the Supreme Court in
Miller has declined to recognize a constitutional right to privacy in
banking records." 93
In passing, the court also noted that Congress had amended
the BSA by providing for a safe harbor to protect banks in
situations like the one raised in this case "by explicitly providing
blanket immunity from civil liability for a bank's disclosure of
information required by Federal law."' 94 Although this safe
harbor, due to its lack of retroactivity, was not applicable to
Marfa,95 the safe harbor became an196 important part of a
subsequent case, Merrill,Lynch v. Green.
In this case, Merrill Lynch had received a tip of suspicious
activity about one of its clients from the British Customs.'9 7
Merrill Lynch apparently reported the suspicions to the U.S.
authorities, and, eventually, $1.6 million was seized from the
customer's account as "proceeds from money laundering and
illegal drug-trafficking."' 198 The customer then brought an
arbitration claim against Merrill Lynch for "colluding" with the
government and for mishandling his account."' In upholding
Merrill Lynch's request for a preliminary injunction against the
customer from proceeding with the arbitration claim, the court
held that Merrill Lynch had acted appropriately and, further, was

190. Id.
191. Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa Nat'l Bank, 896 F. Supp. 1415, 1417-18, 1427
(W.D. Tex. 1995).
192. Id. at 1420.
193. Id. at 1424.
194. Id. at 1423. The safe harbor was codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3).
195. Id. at 1424.
196. Merrill, Lynch v. Green, 936 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
197. Id. at 943.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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immune under the safe harbor of the BSA found at 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318.'00
In a subsequent case, Lopez v. First Union National

Bank,20' the holding at the district court level was similarly that, as
a result of the safe harbor, the bank had "blanket immunity from
civil liability under any federal or state law when reporting
suspicious transactions. 20 2 In a comparable case, Coronado v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp,"3 the district court, located in the same
judicial district as the court in Lopez, quoted the Lopez decision
and delivered the same ruling.: 04
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit joined Lopez
and Coronado and overturned both of them. 5 In reviewing these
cases, the appellate court noted that they were each brought on
the basis of a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a
claim.20 6 Consequently, the court was required to accept the
plaintiffs' complaints as true.27

In Lopez, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank had provided
law enforcement authorities with access to their bank records
"based solely on the 'verbal instructions' of federal law
enforcement authorities."2' s In Coronado, the complaint alleged
that the bank had improperly disclosed protected bank account
information from 1,100 different accounts.2'
In reviewing the facts of each case, the appellate court held
that the safe harbor granted banks immunity from liability for
three different types of disclosure:
(1) A disclosure of any possible violation of law or
regulation.
(2) A disclosure pursuant to § 5318(g).
t0
(3) A disclosure pursuant to any other authority.0
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 943-44.
Lopez v. First Union National Bank,931 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
Id. at 864-65.
Coronado v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, 951 F. Supp. 1025 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
Id. at 1026.
Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 129 F_.d llSb. 1lS (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1188-S9, 1194.
Id.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1191.
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After considerable discussion of these provisions, the court held
that, in order to avail themselves of any of the provisions, the
banks also had to show that they had acted in good faith."1 ' The
court also specifically held that the alleged oral request from a law
enforcement authority in Lopez was insufficient to satisfy the good
faith requirement.212 Similarly, in Coronado, even though the
complaint had alleged that the bank had noted suspicious activity,
unusual amounts of money, and unusual movements of money,
that did not, on its own, justify the bank's disclosure of information
from 1,100 different accounts. 13 Consequently, the banks were
faced with the unfortunate result that if the plaintiffs' complaints
filed against them did not allege that the banks were acting in good
faith-a fact that no complaint would ever be expected to allegethe banks could not have the courts dismiss the cases. 1 4 Pursuant
to the court's ruling, the banks would almost always have to
litigate any actions brought against them in these circumstances,
regardless of how inaccurate the complaints might be.
In Coronado, the complaint, in fact, turned out to be
wholly inaccurate. 15 On the second appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
was persuaded by the bank's motion for summary judgment that
the bank had received a legitimate grand jury subpoena for bank
records covering almost 1,100 accounts. 1 6
Apparently,
BankAtlantic had acquired another bank, Megabank, as well as
the latter's international division that contained approximately
1,100 accounts. 217 After several audits, BankAtlantic determined
that there were suspicious pouches coming from Bogota, Columbia
into the bank's newly acquired international division and that
there were millions of dollars flowing into and out of Columbia-

211. Lopez, 129 F.3d at 1192-93, 1195-96.
212. Id. at 1193.
213. Id. at 1195.
214. Id. at 1193, 1195-96.
215. Coronado v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, 222 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000).
216. Id. at 1316-17, 1319, 1321. This determination was made only after two
district court decisions, "several motions for discovery" and two court of appeals
decisions. Id. This saga took over three and a half years, from before January 22,
1997, when the first district court decision was handed down, 951 F. Supp. 1025 (S.D.
Fla. 1997), to August 18, 2000, when the second Eleventh Circuit decision was
handed down, 222 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2000).
217. Coronado, 222 F.3d at 1317.
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based accounts each month.2" Accordingly, the bank alerted the
authorities, but provided them specific information about only five
of the most obviously suspicious accounts. 2"' After some
investigation, law enforcement authorities responded with the
grand jury subpoena referenced above. -"'
Based on this record, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
lower court's granting of the bank's motion for summary judgment
was proper.2 What is fascinating about the court's decision is not
the holding, but rather the fact that nowhere in the decision is the
term "good faith" mentioned. In fact, the court's references to the
safe harbor are in very strong, albeit ironic, terms: -[b]ut, because
disclosure of financial information-either spontaneously or after
a request from the government-could possibly lead to litigation
with disgruntled customers like Coronado, the Annunzio-Wylie
Act granted immunity to banks making disclosures."
In another appellate decision on the issue, Lee v. Bankers
Trust Co.," the Second Circuit specifically rejected any notion
that there had to be a showing of good faith in order for a bank to
take advantage of the BSA safe harbor provision.? As set forth
by the court:
The safe harbor provision applies, regardless of
whether the SAR [Suspicious Activity Report] is
filed as required by the Act or in an excess of
caution....
The plain language of the safe harbor provision
describes an unqualified privilege, never mentioning
good faith or any suggestive analogue thereof. The
Act broadly and unambiguously provides for
immunity from any law (except the federal
Constitution) for any statement made in [a] SAR by
anyone connected to a financial institution. There is
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id at 1322.
Id. at 1319.
Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 19,9).
Id. at 544-45.
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not even a hint that the statements must be made in
good faith in order to benefit from immunity. Based
on the unambiguous language of the Act, Bankers
Trust enjoys immunity from liability for its filing of,
or any statement made in, [a] SAR.2"
In addition to the difficulty of having to litigate a frivolous case
against a disgruntled customer, as set forth in the last Eleventh
226 the Second Circuit in Lee
Circuit's decision in Coronado,
pointed out the following problem:
Under Plaintiff's theory, he can allege, on
information and belief, that a bank filed [a] SAR
containing allegedly defamatory statements that
were not made in good faith. If the bank sought
summary judgment, it would then have to establish
that the statements in the SAR were made in good
faith, but it would be prohibited by law both from
disclosing the filing or the contents of [a] SAR. It
flies in the face of common sense to assert that
Congress sought to impale financial institutions on
the horns of such a dilemma.227
In the last case on this issue, Stoutt v. Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico,2 8 the court agreed with the Lee decision.229 In Stoutt,
a customer of the bank, who was a resident of the British Virgin

225. Id. at 544. In addition to referencing the "plain language" of the statute, the
court bolstered its holding by referencing the legislative history as well:
Finally, although the safe harbor provision is unambiguous, and

does not require resort to legislative history, the history of the Act
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to limit protection to

statements made in good faith. An earlier draft of the safe harbor
provision included an explicit good faith requirement for
statements made in [a) SAR. However, the requirement was
dropped.

Id.
226. Coronado,222 F.3d at 1319.
227. Lee, 166 F.3d at 544.

228. Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 158 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.P.R. 2001).
229. Id. at 174-75.
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Islands, wanted to borrow $1.5 million from the bank. "3' In order
to secure the loan, the customer had a plan whereby he would
lease $10 million in United States Treasury bills, paving a monthly
interest of $300,000.
The catch was that he had to pay an
"advance fee" of $300,000.1 2 In order to do so, he had to
overdraft his account at the bank. " 3 It took the customer over a
month to realize that the scheme of leasing the Treasury bills was a
scam.'
By that time, the bank had become suspicious of the
customer's actions and excuses and, consequently, filed a SAR. s
The customer was arrested, but the case was later dropped due to
insufficient evidence. 6 At that point, the customer filed suit
against the bank "alleging unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution
and illegal incarceration." 7
The court, in ruling in favor of the bank's motion for
summary judgment, held that the "safe harbor' provision read
literally grants absolute immunity from any federal and or state
cause of action for disclosure of possible violations of law by a
financial institution to the appropriate federal law enforcement
agency. ' 2-" The court specifically found the initial appellate
decision in Lopez to be "unpersuasive"' 2 " and, instead, agreed with
Lee for the reasons set forth in that decision."
In specifically rejecting the customer's claims, the court
noted that the bank:
... did not effectuate the arrest and a grand jury did
find probable cause.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff urges this court to require
financial institutions to make a finding of probable
cause prior to the filing [of] a SAR. However,
230. Id. at 169.
231. Id.
232- Id.
233. Id. at 169-70.

234. Stoutt v. Banco Popular de P.R., 158 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D.P.R. 2(}1 ).
235. Id.

236. Id. at 171.
237. Id. at 168.
238. Id. at 173.
239. Id. at 175.

240. Stoutt, 158 F.Supp. 2d at 174-75.
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requiring financial institutions to reach a finding of
probable cause before filing a SAR would subject
them to a drawn out discovery process similar to the
imposition of a good faith requirement.24'
242 It also
This is exactly what happened, of course, in Coronado.
underscores yet one more reason why the safe harbor provision
should be construed broadly, as the initial district court decision in
Lopez indicated:

[I]n the Congressional Record of January 5, 1993,
there is an Extension of Remarks from the House of
Representatives regarding the Annunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act. See 139 Cong. Rec.
E57-02 (1993). A letter written by Congressman
Frank Annunzio, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions, Washington, D.C. and author
of the Act, was included as part of the
Congressional Record, and notes his deep concern
that financial institutions should be free to report
suspicious transactions without fear of civil liability.
In this letter, Congressman Annunzio states that
Section 5318 of Title 31 of the U.S.C. was amended
in order "to provide the broadest possible
exemption from civil liability for reporting of
suspicious transactions." See 139 Cong. Rec. E57-02
(1993).

"....

Congress wanted to [en]sure that

financial institutions which reported suspicious
transactions should not be held liable to any person
under any law, Federal,
state or local, for making
243
such disclosures." Id.

These cases demonstrate that, while there is an implied
contract of confidentiality, it is not an absolute right of
confidentiality. While the first two cases discussed above indicate
the potential liability in disclosing confidential information to

241. Id. at 175.
242. Coronado v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, 222 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
243. Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 931 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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employers, 2" it is clear that the banks have a duty to disclose
suspicious activity and potential violations of criminal law to law

enforcement authorities.245 While this obligation is now a matter
of statute and regulation, it is one that has existed for a long time.
For instance, in Tournier, the court held that one of the conditions

to the implied contract of confidentiality is the "duty to the public
to disclose." 246 This has been specifically interpreted to include the
duty to disclose potential violations of criminal law.27

Importantly, the BSA safe harbor now protects the bank from
liability

in making

such

disclosures

to

law

enforcement

authorities. 2 s The trend of the cases in construing this safe harbor
appears to be strongly in favor of holding that it provides the
banks absolute immunity and does not require them to establish in
court their good faith.24 9 As set forth in these cases, the logic and
legislative history are clearly in favor of this interpretation.-" The
banking agencies are also in accord with the position:
[T]he OCC and other Federal financial institutions
regulatory agencies believe that the [BSA] 'safe
harbor' provides complete immunity to any
institution that reports a potential crime by filing a
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) in accordance
with the instructions on the SAR form, or by

244. See Roy Elbert Hubs, Jr., To Disclose or Not To Disclose Customer Rccords,
108 BANKIWGN LJ.30 (Jan.-Feb. 1991); Thomas C. Russler & Steven H. Epstein,
Disclosure of Customer Information to Third Parties: When is the Bank Liable?, II1
BANIUNG LJ. 25S (May-June 1994) (discussion of banks' liability for discloing
customer account information).
245. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (1994): 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2001); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11
(2001).
246. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461 (1923).
The initial cases to the contrary dealt primarily v.ith informal requests to the bank
from law enforcement authorities, as opposed to determinations by the bank that
something was suspicious. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529
P.2d 590, 591(Cal. 1975); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 40S A.2d 758, 760 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979).
247. Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 4S2 (Ind. Ct. App. 19S5);
Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1551,1566 (S.D. Fla. 190).
248. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) (1994).
249. Lee v. Bankers Trust Co. 166 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1999); Stoutt v. Banco
Popular de P.R., 158 F. Supp. 167,175 (D.P.R. 2001).
250. Lee, 166 F.3d at 544; Stourt, 158 F.Supp. at 175.
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reporting through other means in accordance with
"'
appropriate agency regulations.25
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BANK SECRECY

ACT

With regard to the cases pertaining to privacy rights and
banks' liability for disseminating customers' financial information,
it is important to note that, since 1970, the cases have been
affected by the passage of the BSA. Most significantly, Miller, in
holding that there was no right to privacy with regard to bank
records, relied heavily on the fact that the BSA required banks to
maintain certain records."' While, at the time of Miller, the
Supreme Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the
BSA, 53 it is important to go back and review the constitutional
attack on the BSA and the courts' analysis of the arguments.
In the primary case that challenged the constitutionality of
the BSA, several bank customers, a bank, the California Bankers
Association and the American Civil Liberties Association brought
suit against John Connally, the then Secretary of the Treasury and
the individual responsible for implementing the BSA. 4 The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary from enforcing the BSA
and its implementing regulations on the grounds that enforcement
of the statute and the regulations would pose "grave and
irreparable injury to their constitutional rights - [including] their
right to freedom from unreasonable search; [and] their
'
constitutional right of privacy."255
In analyzing the BSA, the court
broke the statute down into three components: (1)recordkeeping; (2) reporting of foreign financial transactions; and (3)
reporting of domestic financial transactions.256 Without any real
substantive discussion, the court found that the record-keeping
requirements did not create any constitutional violation.257
With regard to the requirements for reporting foreign
transactions, such as the requirement to report the transportation
251. Safe HarborWhen Filing Suspicious Activity Reports, [Vol. 5] Fed Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) T 51-991, at 58,198 (OCC Advisory Letter 98-4, March 30, 1998).
252. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442-43 (1976).
253. California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 77 (1974).
254. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1243-44 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
255. Id. at 1244.
256. Id. at 1244-45.
257. Id. at 1244.
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of monetary instruments in excess of $5,000 into or out of the
United States, the court held that they too were not
unconstitutional."' In reaching this holding, the court was mindful
that "the Courts should not substitute their judgment for that of
the Congress." 59 The court also noted that the "Supreme Court,
when dealing with matters of reporting to and surveillance by the
executive, has traditionally recognized a distinction between
domestic surveillance, on the one hand, and surveillance where
foreign nations are involved, pointing out that what might be
impermissible in domestic cases may be constitutional where
foreign powers are involved."2 0
The court, however, found that the domestic reporting
requirements were unconstitutional.2 "' First, the court phrased the
question on this issue in a way that dictated the result:
The question is whether these provisions, broadly
authorizing an executive agency of the government
to require financial institutions and parties to or
participants in transactions with them, to routinely
report to it, without previous judicial or
administrative summons, subpoena or warrant, the
detail of almost every conceivable financial
transaction as a surveillance device for the discovery
of possible wrongdoing on the part of bank
customers, is such an invasion of a citizen's right of
privacy as amounts to an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. t
Then, the court provided the answer to the issue by virtually
repeating the question:
[T]he Act in question, insofar as it authorizes the
Secretary to require virtually unlimited reporting
from banks and their customers of domestic
financial transactions as a surveillance device for the
258. Id. at 1244-45.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Stark, 347 F. Supp. at 1245.
Id.
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1246.
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alleged purpose of discovering possible, but
unspecified, wrongdoing among the citizenry, so far
transcends the constitutional limits, as laid down by
the United States Supreme Court for this kind of
legislation, as to unreasonably invade the right of
privacy protected by The Bill of Rights, particularly
the Fourth Amendment provision protecting "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable
263
searches and seizures.,
Unfortunately, the court failed to engage in any kind of
balancing effort between people's privacy rights and the need for
certain domestic reports. More importantly, the court failed to
take into consideration that the reporting requirements authorized
by the BSA were not self-implementing. The court actually
acknowledged that "to date the Secretary has required reporting
only by the financial institutions and then only of currency
transactions over $10,000.,,2' However, the court did not base its
analysis of the reasonableness of the statutory and regulatory
scheme on what was before it. Rather, the court improperly chose
to use extreme language to project what might be required ("the
Act... authorizes the Secretary to require virtually unlimited
reporting... as a surveillance device., 265 ) without analyzing what
was really required.
The Supreme Court, in its decision reversing the district
court, 266 specifically rejected the lower court's framing of the
question quoted immediately above:
Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion,
the statute is not self-executing, and were the
Secretary to take no action whatever under his
authority there would be no possibility of criminal
or civil sanctions being imposed on anyone, the
District Court was wrong in framing the question in
263. Id. at 1251.
264. Id. at 1246.
265. Stark, 347 F.Supp. at 1251.
266. California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
appealed directly from the District Court to the Supreme Court.

This case was
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this manner. The question is not what sort of
reporting requirements might have been imposed by
the Secretary under the broad authority given him
in the Act, but rather what sort of reporting
requirements he did in fact impose under that
authority. 67

In upholding the constitutionality of the BSA, the Court
favorably noted the important reason for the legislation: "The
express purpose of the Act is to require the maintenance of
records, and the making of certain reports, which 'have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings."'' s
The Court went on to note that the reporting requirements
established by the Secretary pursuant to the BSA were not new or
unusual:
[M]ost of the recordkeeping requirements imposed
by the Secretary under the Act merely require the
banks to keep records which most of them had in
the past voluntarily kept and retained, and.., much
of the required reporting of domestic transactions
had been required by earlier Treasury regulations in
effect for nearly 30 years.

9

Prior to the enactment of the Act, financial
institutions had been providing reports of their
customers' large currency transactions pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Treasury which had required reports of all currency
transactions that, in the judgment of the institution,
exceeded those "commensurate with the customary
conduct of the business, industry or profession of
the person or organization concerned. Q71
267. Id. at 64 (emphasis in the original); see id. at 78 (Powell,
268. Id. at 26.
269. Id. at 29-30.

J., concurring).

270. Id. at 37 (citations omitted). The Court cited to a regulation passed in 1949
that required the reporting of transactions involving $1,000 or more in denominations
of $50 or more, or $10,000 or more in any denominations. Id.
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The preexistence of these reporting requirements was also noted
by Congress in passing the BSA:
Criminals deal in money-cash or its equivalent.
The deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of
currency or its equivalent (monetary instruments)
under unusual circumstances may betray a criminal
activity. . . . Reports along this line have been
required by Treasury Department regulations for a
number of years (31 CFR 102).271
In fact, the Senate Report on the legislation explained that the
BSA would provide the specificity and clarity that the previous
legislation and regulations lacked: "under existing Treasury
regulations, currency reports are required on transactions
involving any amount which is unusual in the judgment of the
financial institution. It is anticipated that the regulations under the
proposed legislation will define more
objectively what constitutes
272
transaction.,
currency
an "unusual"
In further addressing the alleged burden that the BSA
reporting requirements might create, the Court reiterated the
straightforward nature of the requirements:
We proceed then to consider the initial contention
of the bank plaintiffs that the recordkeeping
requirements imposed by the Secretary's regulations
under the authority of Title I deprive the banks of
due process by imposing unreasonable burdens
upon them, and by seeking to make the banks the
agents of the government in surveillance of its
citizens.
Such recordkeeping requirements are
scarcely a novelty. 3

271. H.R. REP. No. 91-975 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394,4396.
272. S. REP. No. 91-1139, at 6 (1970).
273. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 45 (1974). The Court went
on to list a number of the existing reporting requirements. Id. at 45-46, n.19.
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Pursuing the burden issue further, the Court noted that the cost
7 4 and could be
burdens on the banks were not unreasonable,2
justified by the fact that the banks were not "complete
bystanders" 275 or "conscripted neutrals in transactions involving
negotiable instruments, but parties to the instruments with a
substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance." '' 76
Moreover, the Court stated that, at least with regard to banks
whose deposits were insured by the federal government, the
reporting requirement imposed could be viewed simply as a
"condition" to doing business.2
In addition, the Court thought that it was important to
focus on the fact that the Secretary was only requiring reports of
currency of more than $10,000.-7'Consequently, the Court had "no
difficulty... in determining that the Secretary's requirements for
the reporting of domestic financial transactions abridge no Fourth
Amendment right of the banks themselves."27 9 As set forth by the
Court: "the regulations do not impose unreasonable reporting
requirements on the banks. The regulations require the reporting
of information with respect to abnormally large transactions in
currency, much of which information the bank as a party to the
transaction already possesses or would acquire in its own
interest." 2 0
In contrast to the well-reasoned and straightforward
majority opinion, the dissent used emotion and hyperbole to argue
its position:
This [Act] wdll cost the banks, it is estimated, over
$6 million a year.... Moreover, they must spy on
their customers. The Bank Secrecy Act requires

274. Id. at 50.
275. Id. at 48.

276. Id. at 48-49; see id. at 52 ("all of the records which the Secretary requires to
be kept pertain to transactions to which the bank %,asitself a party"); id. at (6("The
bank is not a mere stranger or bystander with respect to the transactions -which it is
required to record or report. The bank is itself a party to each of these transactions.
earns portions of its income from conducting such transactions, and in the past may
have kept records of similar transactions on a voluntary basis for its own purposcs.").
277. Id. at 50.
278. Id. at 39, 63.

279. CaliforniaBankersAss'n, 416 U.S. at 66.
280. Id. at 67.
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banks to record and retain the details of their
customers' financial lives.2 8'
It would be highly useful to governmental espionage
to have like reports from all our bookstores, all our
hardware and retail stores, all our drugstores.
These records too might be "useful" in criminal
investigations.
One's reading habits furnish telltale clues to those
who are bent on bending us to one point of view.
What one buys at the hardware and retail stores
may furnish clues to potential uses of wires, soap
powders, and the like used by criminals.
A
mandatory recording of all telephone conversations
would be better than the recording of checks under
the Bank Secrecy Act, if Big Brother is to have his
way....
It is, I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with the
Secretary that all bank records of every citizen "have
a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations of proceedings." That is
unadulterated nonsense unless we are to assume
that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot
make.
Since the banking transactions of an individual give
a fairly accurate account of his religion, ideology,
opinions, and interests, a regulation impounding
them and making them automatically available to all
federal investigative agencies is a sledge-hammer
approach to a problem that only a delicate scalpel
can manage.282
While this is colorful and exciting rhetoric, it is wide of the mark.
First, as the majority indicated, as well as Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion, the review of the constitutionality of the Act
281. Id. at 80.
282. Id. at 85.

20021

PRIVACY RIGHTS

197

cannot be based on the extreme speculation of what the statute
might authorize, but rather on what is actually before the Court."'
Further, the BSA does not require the banks to "spy" on their
customers, but instead to simply retain copies of documents that
the banks already possess, to which banks are a party, and that
were found to "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings"'
and to report
"abnormally large transactions in currency."' ," These reportable
cash transactions in excess of $10,000 are, in fact, unusual for most
individuals and certainly do not constitute "all bank records of
every citizen. , 216 Nor do these large cash transactions indicate in
any way a customer's "religion, ideology, opinions, and
interests."2

7

The dissent, written by Justice Douglas, complained of the
government's purported use of a "sledge-hammer" instead of a
"delicate scalpel."253 It would seem, though, that a requirement
for pre-ex.isting records to be maintained and for certain
"abnormally large transactions in currency"2F'11
not to be outlawed,
but simply reported, is hardly heavy-handed. Rather, it appears to
be the specific and measured approach Justice Douglas called for.
In United States v. Kaatz,2k' decided a number of years after
Schultz, a lower court reiterated the constitutionality of the BSAand upheld the propriety of a bank filing a "currency transaction
report (CTR)." In this case, three brothers owned and ran a
hardware store. An investigation into their affairs was triggered
by a bank's filing of a CTR.

92

It appears that the brothers had

used $96,000 in cash to purchase a $100,000 certificate of
283. Id. at 64; see id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). "The question is not vhat sort
of reporting requirements might have been imposed by the Secretary under the broad
authority given him in the Act, but rather what sort of reporting requirements he did
in fact impose under that authority." Id. at 64.
284. Id. at 26, 31. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.15 (2001) (-The Secretary hereby
determines that the reports required by this subpart have a high degree of usefulness

in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.").
285. CaliforniaBankers Assn, 416 U.S. at 67.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.

290. United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1983).
291. Id. at 1242.
292. Id. at 1240.
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deposit. 293 At the trial, tellers from the bank testified that, almost
daily, one of the brothers would present two sets of checks at the
bank; one set of checks would be deposited into the hardware
company's account, but the other set of checks would be cashed in
aggregate amounts varying from $400 to $2,500.294 An IRS agent
also testified at the trial that there wasn't a single instance of the
company's records showing a cash payment for an over-thecounter sale. 295 Not surprisingly, the brothers were convicted for
filing false income tax returns and for evasion of income tax.
On appeal, the reviewing court upheld the convictions and
held that the bank's actions were proper. 96 Specifically, the court
noted that reporting requirements of the BSA had been upheld in
California Bankers Association29 7 and that, pursuant to United

States v. Miller,298 the plaintiffs did not have a legitimate
"expectation of privacy" concerning information contained in
bank records.299
While Miller held that individuals do not have any
"legitimate 'expectation of privacy"' in their financial records
maintained by banks,3" the records required by the BSA are not
that extensive or invasive and the protections of the RFPA, passed
in response to Miller,"1 serve as an adequate protection against
indiscriminate and improper dissemination of a person's financial
records.
VIII. BSA REQUIREMENTS
As set forth above, the BSA was passed in 1970."° Since
then, the BSA has been amended several times: 3 the

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Kaatz, 705 F.2d at 1239-42.
297. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
298. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
299. Kaatz, 705 F.2d at 1242. The court did not discuss the restrictions of the
RFPA, which, in any event, appear to have not been relevant to the case.
300. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
301. H.R. REP. No. 1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306.
302. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959; 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5355).
303. See Baldwin., supra note 28, at 425.
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984;"
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the Money

Laundering Control Act of 1986; "' the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of

1988;306 the Depository Institution Money Laundering
Amendment Act of 1990;" the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 1992;-'03 the Money Laundering Suppression

Act of 1994;309 and the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001310

Some of the primary provisions of the BSA are as follows:
31 U.S.C § 5313-Reports on domestic coins and currency
transactions.

This provision authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
require financial institutions to make a report of certain
transactions "for the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States
coins or currency." 3" This provision was implemented primarily in
31 C.F.R. § 103.22 which requires financial institutions to file

reports (Currency Transaction Reports or CTRs) "of each deposit,
withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by,

through, or to such financial institution which involves a
transaction in currency of more than $10,000. 12

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-2194 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (19Mb).
Pub. L. No. 100-690,102 Stat. 4181 (19SS).
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
Pub. L. No. 102-550,106 Stat. 3672, 4044-4074 (1992).
Pub. L. No. 103-325,108 Stat. 2160, 2243-2.S5 (1994).
Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (2001).
31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994).
When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction
for the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or
currency (or other monetary instruments the Secretary of the
Treasury prescribes), in an amount, denomination, or amount and
denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary prescribes by
regulation, the institution and any other participant in the
transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the
transaction at the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes....

Id.
312. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.2 states:
Reports of transactions in currency.

200

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 6

Contrary to the concerns voiced in various cases reviewed
above, to the effect that reports like this "give a fairly accurate
account of [an individual's] religion, ideology, opinions, and
interests.
,,,3"3 these reports of "abnormally large transactions in
currency..."314 would reveal very little about the individual,
except for the possibility of their being involved in illegal activity.
As the legislative history to the BSA noted: "criminals deal in
money---cash or its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawal of
large amounts of currency or its equivalent (monetary
instruments)
under unusual circumstances may betray a criminal
31 5
activity.
To the extent the conduct reflects the normal, appropriate
activity of a business, an extensive process exists within the BSA
for exempting such businesses.31 6
31 U.S.C. § 5314-Records and reports on foreign financial
agency transactions.
This section primarily authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to require reports concerning accounts maintained in
foreign banks.317 This section is implemented in 31 C.F.R. § 103.24
(a) General. This section sets forth the rules for the reporting by
financial institutions of transactions in currency. The reporting

obligations themselves are stated in paragraph (b) of this section.
The reporting rules relating to aggregation are stated in paragraph
(c) of this section. Rules permitting banks to exempt certain
transactions from the reporting obligations appear in paragraph
(d) of this section.
(b) Filing obligations. (1) Financialinstitutionsother than casinos.
Each financial institution other than a casino shall file a report of
each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment

or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which
involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000, except as
otherwise provided in this section....

Id.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

CaliforniaBankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 67.
S. REP. No. 91-1139, at 6 (1970).
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(d) (2001).
31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1994). The relevant portion of section 5314 states:
(a) Considering the need to avoid impeding or controlling the
export or import of monetary instruments and the need to avoid
burdening unreasonably a person making a transaction with a
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which requires individuals to report on their annual tax forms
whether they hold an account in a foreign bank."' Clearly, this
provision does not affect very many people. In addition, in light of
the need, as stated in the statute, for obtaining the requested
information, this section would appear not to be overly invasive.
31 U.S.C. §5316-Reports on exporting and importing
monetary instruments.

This section primarily authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to require individuals to make a report whenever they
transport $10,000 in currency or monetary instruments into or out
of the country 1 9 This section was implemented through the
foreign financial agency, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
require a resident or citizen of the United States or a person in,
and doing business in, the United States, to keep records, file
reports, or keep records and file reports, v.hen the resident, citizen,
or person makes a transaction or maintains a relation for any
person vth a foreign financial agency. The records and reports
shall contain the follovAng information in the v.ay and to the
extent the Secretary prescribes:
(1) the identity and address of participants in a transaction or
relationship.
(2) the legal capacity in which a participant is acting.
(3) the identity of real parties in interest.
(4) a description of the transaction....
Id.
31S. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.24 states:
Reports of foreign financial accounts.
(a) Each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States... having a financial interest in, or signature or other
authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account in a
foreign country shall report such relationship to the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue ......
Id.
319. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994). The relevant portion of section 5316 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (el of this section, a person or
an agent or bailee of the person shall file a report under subsection
(b) of this section when the person, agent, or bailee knovingly
(1) transports ... monetary instruments of more than 10,000 at
one time
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside
the United States; or
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issuance of 31 C.F.R. § 103.23.320
This provision is equally
important as the provision requiring the filing of CTRs, and due to
the infrequency of the need for such filings, they would represent
even less of a possible incursion into one's privacy.
* 12 U.S. C. § 1829b-Retention of records by
depository institutions.
* 12 U.S.C. § 1953-Recordkeeping and procedures.

insured

These two sections authorize the Secretary of the Treasury
to require certain reports pertaining to banking accounts and
certain banking transactions.321 The implementing regulations
include 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.33 and 103.34 which require, among other
things:

(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place outside
the United States; or
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one
time transported into the United States from more through a place
outside the United States....
Id.
320. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.23 states:
Reports of transportation of currency or monetary instruments.
(a) Each person who physically transports, mails, or ships, or
causes to be physically transported, mailed, or shipped ...
currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount
exceeding $10,000 at one time from the United States to any place
outside the United States, or into the United States from any place
outside the United States, shall make a report thereof. ...
Id.
321. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(B) (2000). The relevant portion of section 1829(B) states:
(a) Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.
(1) The Congress finds that adequate records maintained by
insured depository institutions have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings....
(b) Recordkeeping regulations.
(1) In general.
Where the Secretary of the Treasury... determines that the
maintenance of appropriate types of records and other evidence by
insured depositors institutions has a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, he shall
prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this section....
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(a) A record of each extension of credit in an
amount in excess of $10,000;

(b) Certain information with respect to a Are
transfer in the amount of $3,000 or more; and
(c) The bank to make a reasonable effort to secure
and maintain a record of the taxpayer identification
number vith respect to each certificate of deposit
sold or redeemed or each deposit or share account

opened.'"
31 U.S.C. § 5325-Identification required to purchase certain
monetary instruments.

This section requires a financial institution to verify the
identity of an individual who purchases a bank check Ath $3,000
or more in currency32- This requirement is implemented through
322. 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.33 states:
Records to be made and retained by financial institutions.
Each financial institution shall retain either the original or a
microfilm or other copy or reproduction of each of the following:
(a) A record of each extension of credit in an amount in excess of
$10,000, except an extension of credit secured by an interest in real
property, vhich record shall contain the name and address of the
person to whom the extension of credit is made, the amount
thereof, the nature or purpose thereof, and the date thereof.
(b) A record of each advice, request, or instruction received or
given regarding any transaction resulting... in the transfer of
currency or other monetary instruments, funds, checks, investment
securities, or credit, of more than S10,030 to or from any person,
account, or place outside of the United States....
(e) Banks. Each agent, agency, branch, or office located within
the United States of a bank is subject to the requirements of this
paragraph (e) vith respect to a funds transfer in the amount of
$3,000 or more ....
Id.
31 C.F.R § 103.34 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.34 states:
Additional records to be made and retained by banks.
(a)(1) With respect to each certificate of deposit sold or
redeemed ... or each deposit or share account opened vith a
bank... a bank shall [make a reasonable effort to]... secure and
maintain a record of the taxpayer identification number of the
customer involved ....
323. 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1994). The relevant portion of section 5325 states:
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31 C.F.R. § 103.29 which requires certain specific information such
as name of the purchaser, date of purchase, method of payment,
and the type of payment.
31 C.F.R. §103.18-Reports of banks
transactions.

of suspicious

In addition to these requirements, the BSA contains a
requirement that financial institutions file Suspicious Activity
Reports similar to those mandated by the banking agencies.324

Identification required to purchase certain monetary instruments.
(a) In general. No financial institution may issue or sell a bank
check, cashier's check, traveler's check, or money order to any
individual in connection with a transaction or group of such
contemporaneous transactions which involves United States coins
or currency ... of $3,000 or more unless (1) the individual has a transaction account with such financial
institution and the financial institution (A) verifies that fact through a signature card or other
information... and
(B) records the method of verification ... or
(2) the individual furnishes the financial institution with such forms
of identification as the Secretary of the Treasury may require in
regulations ....
Id.
324. 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (2001). The relevant portion of section 103.18 states:
Reports by banks of suspicious transactions.
(a) General. (1) Every bank shall file with the Treasury
Department, to the extent and in the manner required by this
section, a report of any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible violation of law or regulation....
(2) A transaction requires reporting under the terms of this
section if it is conducted or attempted by, at, or through the bank,
it involves or aggregates at least $5,000 in funds or other assets,
and the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that:
(i) The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or
is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or
assets derived from illegal activities.., as part of a plan to violate
or evade any federal law or regulation or to avoid any transaction
reporting requirement under federal law or regulation;
(ii) The transaction is designed to evade any requirements of this
part or of any other regulations promulgated under the Bank
Secrecy Act;
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While these provisions are extensive, they are not overly

burdensome and are designed to obtain simply that information
which, as the Secretary of the Treasury determined, "have a high

degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings." 3 -

a-X. THE PATRIOT ACT
On October 26,2001, the Patriot Act was signed into law."'
While it was passed in a hurry, the groundwork for the legislation
was in existence much earlier.3 _7

The Act requires a number of things, but the provisions
that primarily affect individuals are as follows:
o

Section 312-Special due diligence for correspondent
accountsandprivate banking accounts.

This section requires each bank that opens or maintains a
private banking or correspondent account in the United States for
a foreign individual to "establish appropriate, specific, and, where

necessary, enhanced due diligence polices, procedures, and
controls that are reasonably designed to detect and report
(iii) The transaction has no business or apparent lavful purpose or
is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be
expected to engage, and the bank lmows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts,
including the background and possible purpose of the
transaction....
Id.
325. 31 C.F.R. § 103.15 (2001). For a summary of the BSA, see INFORIATION
TECINOLOGIES, supra note 7, at 35-39 for a summary of the BSA; see also L.
RICHARD FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 4-2 - 4-4 (A.S. Pratt & Sons)
(2001).
326. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (-USA Patriot Act"),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter PatriotAct].
327. 147 CONG. REC. S10564 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement by Sen.
Sarbanes) ("The modernization of our money laundering laws represented by
Subtitle I [of the Patriot Act] is long overdue. It is not the work of one week or one
weekend, but represents years of careful study and a bipartisan effort to produce a
piece of prudent legislation."); see MINORITY STAFF OF THE U.S. SENATE PERMoN ET
SUBCONnI.

ON INVESTIGATIONS,

REPORT ON CORRESFONDENT

BANKING: A

GATEWAY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING (Feb. 5, 2001), available at
http:/I/vlTw.senate.gov/-gov-affairslpsifinalreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2092).
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instances of money laundering through those accounts. ' ' 328 If a
bank opens or maintains a private banking account for a foreigner,
the bank must ensure that it takes "reasonable steps to ascertain
the identity of the nominal and beneficial owners of, and the
source of funds deposited into, such account as needed to guard
against money laundering and report any suspicious
transactions.
,,329
The term "private banking account" is defined in the Act as
an account that:
(i) requires minimum aggregate deposits of funds or
other assets of not less than $1,000,000;
(ii) is established on behalf of one or more
individuals who have a direct or beneficial
ownership interest in the account; and
(iii) is assigned to, or is administered or managed
by, in whole or in part, an officer employee, or agent
of a financial institution acting as a liaison between
the financial institution
and the direct or beneficial
330
account.
the
of
owner
This section also requires that each bank that opens or maintains
an account on behalf of "a senior foreign political figure" shall
"conduct enhanced scrutiny of any such account" and shall take
"reasonable steps ... to detect and report transactions that may
33
involve the proceeds of foreign corruption. '
In light of its exclusive focus on large private banking
accounts opened or maintained for foreigners and on the accounts
of "senior foreign political figures," this section does not even
affect United States customers. In addition, with regard to the

328.
329.
330.
331.
issuing

PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 312 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. The Department of the Treasury and the banking agencies joined in
a guidance report on dealing with foreign corrupt officials. THE U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE BOARD OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, THE
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, AND THE DEP'T OF STATE,
GUIDANCE ON
ENHANCED SCRUTINY FOR TRANSACTIONS THAT MAY INVOLVE PROCEEDS OF
FOREIGN OFFICIAL CORRUPTION (Jan. 2001), availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/

releases/guidance.htm (last visited Feb. 26,2002).
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private banking accounts and the foreign political officials on
which the section focuses, all that is required is for the bank to
engage in enhanced due diligence and, as already required by law,
to report suspicious activity. " The need for caution in this area is
clearly warranted in light of the issues raised regarding various
high profile cases that involve corruption of foreign officials who
have laundered their money through U.S. banks. " '
Section 314 - Cooperative efforts to deter money laundering.
The primary aspect of this section which affects individuals
is the authorization for banks to share information with one
another, after notification to the Secretary of the Treasury,
"regarding individuals, entities, organizations, and countries
suspected of possible terrorist or money laundering activities.""
It should be stressed, however, that, as set forth in the Act, this
ability to share information is limited to situations where
notification has been made to the Secretary of the Treasury and
where terrorism or money laundering is suspected. It does not
authorize the dissemination of routine account or financial
information or even the disclosure of information such as
overdrafts in an account."' 5
Another perspective on this provision is the fact that the
many nationwide branches and offices of a large bank have access
to the same account information within that bank system. If any
332- See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (1994), 12 C.FR. § 21.11 (2001); 31 C.F.R. § 103.18
(2001).
333. Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and
Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before the PermanentSubconmu. on Investigations, 106th

Cong. 428 (1999) (Minority Staff Report) [hereinafter Private Banhing]; U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,

PERNM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
SENATE, PRIVATE BANKING: RAUL SALINAS, CITIBANK, AND ALLEGED MONEY

LAUNDERING (Oct. 199S) [GAO Report]; Private Banking: Raul Salinas, Citibank,
and Alleged Money Laundering, Hearing Before the Perm. Subconm. on
Investigations,Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 106th Cong. 171 (Nov. 9. 1999)

(statement for the Record of Robert H. Hast, Acting Assistant Comptroller General
for Investigations, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Gen. Acet. Office)
[hereinafter Hast statement].
334. PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 314 (2001).
335. The dissemination of credit information, as authorized by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16S1-1681u (2000), is more comprehensive than this
narrowly tailored provision.
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branches of such a bank were to close an account due to suspected
money laundering, the bank's other branches throughout the
country would be aware of this information and would know to
take extra precautions before opening another account for the
same individual or company. Once the necessary procedures are
satisfied, a bank in a small town will also be able to share similar
concerns and warnings with the bank across the street. Even then,
though, as mentioned above, the concerns must be limited to two
specific areas-money laundering and terrorism.
Section 325-Concentrationaccounts at financialinstitutions.
This section allows the Secretary of Treasury to issue
regulations that would prohibit banks from allowing its customers
to move their funds anonymously through concentration
accounts.336 Further, the section states that if a bank does use a
concentration account to commingle and transfer its customers'
funds, the bank must be able to document and trace the funds and
identify what funds belong to which customer. 337 The problem this
section addresses is the situation that occurred at Citibank where
an officer of the bank allowed Raul Salinas, the brother of the then
President of Mexico, to transfer close to $100 million anonymously
through the bank to various places such as the Cayman Islands,
Switzerland, and London.338 This provision should not adversely
affect the privacy rights of individuals; it simply prevents them
from transferring sums of money anonymously through
international channels.339

336. PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 325 (2001). Concentration accounts are
ordinarily defined as General Ledger accounts that the bank itself uses for interbank

transactions.
337. Id.
338. Private Banking, supra note 333; GAO Report, supra note 333; Hast
Statement, supra note 333.
339. As set forth by one commentator, "Judge Brandeis's definition of privacy was
'the right to be [let] alone,' not the right to operate in absolute secrecy." John
Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,

March 3, 1999, at Al (quoting Paul Saffo, a researcher at the Institute for the Future
in Menlo Park, Calif.).
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Section 326-Verification of Identification.

This section of the Act requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue regulations that will set forth procedures for
verifying the identity of customers seeking to open accounts at
banks.'O The regulation will require "reasonable procedures" for
verifying identity "to the extent reasonable and practicable." '
This section also provides for studies and recommendations
for the "most timely and effective way to require foreign nationals
to provide domestic financial institutions and agencies with
appropriate and accurate information" concerning their identity."
In light of the fact that proper verification of identity at the
time of account opening is a necessary and common practice, this
requirement, which stresses the need for "reasonable procedures,"
should not create undue privacy concerns. In weighing privacy
interests against those of the public, in general, and the banks, in
particular, in safe and sound banking operations free from money
laundering and fraud, it should be noted that the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) SAR Activity Review of June
2001 cited identity theft as the number one trend in suspicious
activities. 3 FinCEN's updated SAR Activity Review, issued in
October 2001, noted, in fact, that the instances of identity theft (as
measured by the number of reports filed) had continued to
increase from forty-four such reports in 1997 to 267 reports in
1999, to 637 reports in 2000, and to 332 reports for the first three
months of 2001 (for an annualized amount in 2001 of 996
reports).

340. PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56. § 326 2(001).
34L Id.
342. Id.
343. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPrROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, THE SAR AcrIvITY REvIEV: TRENDS, TIFS & ISSUES (No. 2) 14-17
(June 2001), available at http:11vwww.treas.govlfincn sarreiew2issue4web.pdf last

visited Feb. 26,2002).
344. U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY. THE SAP,AcrivIry REvIEW: TRENDS, Tips & ISSUES (No. 3)24-25 (Oct.

2001), available at httpJll,,,w.treas.govlfincenf/sarrexiewlssue3.pdf (last visited Feb.
26,2002).
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" Section 351-Amendments relating to reporting of suspicious
activities.
" Section 355-Authorization to include suspicions of illegal
activity in written employment references.
These two sections together provide for a safe harbor for
banks, in response to requests for employment references, to
provide information about the "possible involvement" of
'
employees in "potentially unlawful activity."345
Prior to this time,
banks could not take any steps to protect another bank from hiring
an embezzler without the risk of being sued for slander, libel or
violation of privacy. Even though a bank was required to report
the "potentially unlawful activity" to the government,346 the bank
had no protection if it reported the same information to another
bank that was considering employing the person. The potential
problem was that, even though the bank had filed a Suspicious
Activity Report (SAR), all too often, in light of prosecutorial
dollar thresholds, the low-level embezzler would not be prosecuted
and would be able to proceed from one bank to another bank and
to engage in fraud or embezzlement all over again.347
A potential drawback to these two sections, however, is
that no safe harbor exists for a bank that makes a disclosure
pursuant to this authority "with malicious intent." While the
intent of this provision is obvious and well-meaning, if "malicious
intent" were construed to include the situation where the first
bank intends to convince the second bank not to hire a person,
that will be an obvious problem. In addition, even without such a
strained interpretation, this provision could be very problematic
since a disgruntled employee, fired for fraud or embezzlement, can
easily allege some kind of vague or general malicious behavior on
345. PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 351,355 (2001).
346. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2001); 31 C.F.R. § 103.18
(2001).
347. The OCC has addressed this problem, in part, by putting into place a "fasttrack" program whereby the agency considers bringing removal actions against
insiders who were the subject of a SAR, were not prosecuted, but meet the grounds

for a removal. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL 5310-8 (Subject: Fast Track
Enforcement Program) (March 11, 1996) (available by request from the OCC). If the
agency successfully removes these individuals from the industry through the use of its

administrative powers under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2000), then the individual cannot,
without regulatory permission, work in the banking industry. Id. at 4-5.
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the part of the bank. Regardless of whether there is any validity to
the claim, the bank vill have to defend itself.

That process not

only subjects the bank to needless and expensive litigation, but it
also has the potential of discouraging a bank from giving an honest
and frank employment reference in close cases.
0 Section 358--Bank secrecy provisions and activities of United
States intelligence agenciesto fight internationalterrorism.

This section provides for an exception to the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) ." Specifically, the section amends
the RFPA to allow for easier dissemination to the appropriate
government agency of information pertaining to intelligence and
counterintelligence relating to international terrorism.3' In light
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, this provision is an
understandable and supportable addition to the RFPA exceptions
described below.
In summary, the Patriot Act provides helpful additions and
amendments to the BSA, especially those provisions that support
enhanced due diligence with regard to high-risk accounts, that
restrict obviously high-risk transactions, and that allow for
increased sharing between banks in order to better protect the
industry to eliminate fraud. As set forth above, these provisions
do not appear to unduly affect any privacy rights and are
particularly important as demonstrated by the horrible terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.
X. GUIDELINES ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT

In addition to the numerous pieces of legislation that
compose the BSA, -"' various organizations have issued numerous
pieces of guidance which mirror and support the requirements of
the BSA and the Patriot Act.
For instance, regarding account opening, the BSA requires
that certain steps be taken to verify the identity of the customer,
348. See supra notes 127-251 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of a
bank having to defend itself against baseless lay, suits).
349. PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 358 (2001).
350. Id.
351. See supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
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including obtaining the customer's social security number.352 In
addition, certain identifying information needs to be obtained
when wire transfers over $3,000 are sent, or when a bank check is
purchased with $3,000 or more in currency.353 Pursuant to Section
326 of the Patriot Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is to issue
regulations that will set forth procedures for verifying the identity
of customers seeking to open accounts at banks.354
This emphasis on properly identifying customers is echoed
by various industry issuances. Specifically, the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF),355 which issued a set of
"Forty Recommendations" in June of 1996 to help combat
international money laundering, addressed identification issues
in a number of its recommendations. 356 Among these
recommendations are the following:
10. Financial institutions ... should be required...
to identify, on the basis of an official or other
reliable identifying document, and record the
identity of their clients, either occasional or usual,
when establishing business relations or conducting
transactions (in particular opening of accounts...).
In order to fulfill identification requirements
concerning legal entities, financial institutions
should, when necessary, take measures:
i. to verify the legal existence and structure of the
customer....
ii. to verify that any person purporting to act on
behalf of
the customer is so authorised and identify that
person.
352.
353.
103.33,
354.
355.

12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 1953 (2000); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.33, 103.34 (2001).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1953 (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1994); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.29,
103.34 (2001).
PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326 (2001).
The FATF was established by the "Group of Seven" at its economic
conference in Paris in 1989. FISCHER, supra note 325, at 4-16.
356. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, TEi

RECOMMENDATIONS
(June
1996),
available
40Recsen.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).

at

FORTY

http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/
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11. Financial institutions should take reasonable
measures to obtain information about the true
identity of the persons on whose behalf an account
is opened or a transaction conducted .... 3"
Similarly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
issued guidance in October, 2001 on Customer due diligence for
banks, which also emphasizes the importance of obtaining the true
identity of the customer. 5S In that publication, the Basel
Committee notes the following:
1. Supervisors around the world are increasingly
recognising the importance of ensuring that their
banks have adequate controls and procedures in
place so that they know the customers with whom
they are dealing. Adequate due diligence on new
and e-asting customers is a key part of these
controls. Without this due diligence, banks can
become subject to reputational, operational, legal
and concentration risks, which can result in
significant financial cost.
20.
Banks should develop clear customer
acceptance policies and procedures, including .1
description of the types of customer that are likely
to pose a higher than average risk to a bank. In
preparing such policies, factors such as customers'
background, country of origin, public or high profile
position, linked accounts, business activities or other
risk indicators should be considered....
22. Banks should establish a systematic procedure
for identifying new customers and should not

357. Id.
358. THE BASEL CO MIITEE ON BANING SUPERVISION, CUSTOMER DUE
DILIGENCE FOR BANKis (Guidance Letter, Publ'n No. 85, Oct. 2001), available at
http'lhw ww.,.bis.orgtpublbcbs85.pdf (last %isited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter BASEL
GUIDANcEI.
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establish a banking relationship until the identity of
a new customer is satisfactorily verified.
23. The best documents for verifying the identity of
customers are those most difficult to obtain illicitly
and to counterfeit....
27. Banks need to obtain all information necessary
to establish to their full satisfaction the identity of
each new customer and the purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship ..."'
The need for care is especially great in private banking due to the
high risk nature of these accounts. 6 It is for this reason that
Section 312 of the Patriot Act requires that banks "establish
appropriate, specific, and, where necessary, enhanced due
diligence polices, procedures, and controls that are reasonably
designed to detect and report instances of money laundering
through those accounts" when foreigners open private bank
accounts.36 ' When a bank opens or maintains a private banking
account for a foreigner, the bank must take "reasonable steps to
ascertain the identity of the nominal and beneficial owners of, and
the source of funds deposited into, such account.... 362
Accordingly, the Basel Committee provided the following
guidance:
25. Banks that offer private banking services are
particularly exposed to reputational risk, and should
therefore apply enhanced due diligence to such
operations.... All new clients and new accounts
should be approved by at least one person, of
appropriate seniority, other than the private
banking relationship manager.363

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 1-11.
See supra notes 333 and 338 and accompanying text.
PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 312 (2001).
Id.
BASEL GUIDANCE, supra note 358, at 11.
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In addition, a new group composed of eleven of the world's
largest banks and Transparency International, a global anticorruption organization, issued guidance on October 30, 2000,
called the "Global Anti-Money-Laundering Guidelines for Private
Banking-Wolfsberg AML Principles" addressing just private
banking."6 Part of the guidance provided the following:
The bank will endeavor to accept only those clients
whose source of wealth and funds can be reasonably
established to be legitimate ....
?"'
Beneficial ownership must be established for all
accounts. Due diligence must be done on all
principal beneficial owners ....
?b
It is essential to collect and record information covering the
following categories:
Purpose and reasons for opening the
account;
13
Anticipated account activity;
13
Source of wealth (description of the
economic activity which has generated the
net worth);
13
Estimated net worth;
[3 Source of funds (description of the origin
and the means of transfer for monies that are
accepted for the account opening); and
13
References or other sources to corroborate
reputation information where available2'
The Wolfsberg principles also indicate that additional due
diligence should be required when any of the following are
involved:
364. TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAl.
Global
Anti-Money-Laundering
Guidelines for Private Banking - Wolfsberg AML Principles (Oct. 30, 2000). arailable
at http..lAvw.transparency.orgpressreease-_arhivei200v.oIfsberg-principles.htmI
(last visited Feb, 28,2002).
365. Id. § 1.1.
366. Id. § 1.2.2.
367. Id. § 1-3.
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" Numbered accounts;

" High-risk countries;
" Offshore jurisdictions;
" High-risk activities; or
"
Public officials. 68
With respect to dealing with public officials, the Wolfsberg
principles state: "Individuals who have or have had positions of
public trust such as government officials, senior executives of
government corporations, politicians, important political party
officials, etc. and their families and close associates require
heightened scrutiny. 3 69 The risk of banks receiving funds from
corrupt officials, of course, is part of the focus of Section 312 of the
Patriot Act which requires "enhanced scrutiny" of accounts
maintained by a "senior foreign political figure."37 The concern
about foreign corrupt officials laundering their money was also the
focus of the Treasury guidance issued in January, 2001.371 The
Basel Committee touched on the issue in the following way:
41. Business relationships with individuals holding
important public positions and with persons or
companies clearly related to them may expose a
bank to significant reputational and/or legal
risks. 372
The existence of these various pronouncements by industry and
international groups clearly underscores the support and need for
strong anti-money laundering enforcement measures. However, as
Treasury Deputy Secretary Dam recently testified, there is always
a balancing issue to address:
We acknowledge, as we must, that now more than
ever law enforcement and the intelligence
community must have the ability to obtain and share
financial information. However, that need must
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. § 2.
Id. § 2.5.
PatriotAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 312(a)(i)(2)(B)(ii) (2001).
See supra note 332.
BASEL GUIDANCE, supra note 358, at 14.
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always be balanced against our fundamental notions
of privacy. Stridng that balance is the challenge for
Treasury as we implement this legislation."

Consequently, it is necessary to closely review the requirements of
the privacy statutes, in particular, the RFPA, and to explore
whether its protections are sufficient while not impeding necessary
anti-money laundering enforcement procedures.
X. THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
"The centerpiece of federal statutory efforts to protect
individual privacy is the federal Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978."" 7 In general, "the RFPA prohibits financial institutions
from disclosing a customer's financial records to the federal
government except in limited circumstances such as pursuant to
the customer's authorization, an administrative subpoena or
summons, a search warrant, a judicial subpoena, or a formal
written request in connection with a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry, or to a supervisory agency in connection with its
supervisory, regulatory, or monetary function." ' s Specifically, the
RFPA has three basic purposes:
(1) to require that customers be notified before
disclosure of their records to the government; (2) to
give customers standing to challenge release of their
records to the government; and (3) to require
government agencies to produce a "paper trail"
documenting the disclosure of customer information
to the government, as well as any interagency
transfer of such information.

373. Kenneth W. Dam Testimony, supra note 31.
374. FISCHER, supra note 325, at 2-1. While there are many other privacy statutes,
this paper will only focus on the RFPA due to its relevance to the disclosure of
customers' financial information to the federal Government.
375. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, PRIVACY LAWS AND REGULATIONS 8 (Sept. S. 200), available at

http:lhww,,wv.oce.treas.govlftpfbulletin2000-25a.pdf(last visited Feb. 28, 2102).
376. FISCHER, supra note 325, at 2-3.
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The specific provisions of the RFPA include the following:
* 12 U.S.C. §3401-Definitions.
This definitional section is important in that it limits the
scope of the RFPA to individuals and to partnerships of five or
fewer people.3"
* 12 U.S. C. § 3402-Access to financial records by government
authoritiesprohibited;exceptions.
This section sets out the basic premise that the federal
government cannot obtain access to any records of a financial
institution unless in accordance with one of the exceptions
contained in the RFPA.
* 12 U.S.C. § 3403-Confidentialityoffinancial records.
This section sets out the reverse premise that no financial
institution can provide bank records to the federal government
unless in accordance with the provisions of the RFPA.378 In
addition, this section requires a certification from the government
seeking records to the effect that it has complied with the
applicable provisions of the R-FPA.37 9
However, this section allows for a financial institution to
notify the government that it has information relevant to a
possible violation of law, and allows the bank to provide the
government with identifying information concerning the individual
and the account involved as well as an explanation of "the nature
of [the] suspected illegal activity."38 This provision also contains a
safe harbor for the financial institution.38'

377. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2000).

37& Id. § 3403(a).
379. Id. § 3403(b).
380. Id. § 3403(c).
381. Id.
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12 U.S.C. § 3404-Customerauthorizations.

This section provides for customers to authorize
disclosure." 2 Importantly, the statute indicates that 3authorization
cannot be required as a condition to doing business
o

12 U.S.C. § 3405-Administrativesubpoenaand summons.

This provision indicates that the federal government can
obtain financial records pursuant to an administrative subpoena if.
(a) "there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant
to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry"; (b) a copy of the
subpoena has been served on the customer ten days prior to the
return date for the subpoena; and (c) the customer has not
contested
the subpoena pursuant to procedures set out in the
3S
RFPA.
o

12 U.S..

§ 3406-Search warrants.

This section permits the federal government to obtain
financial records with the use of a search warrant obtained
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. "" However,
an after-the-fact notice has to be sent to the customer within 90
days, or after a longer period of time if authorized by a court.""
12 U.S.C. § 3407-Judicialsubpoena.

This section allows for the use of a court subpoena, with the
same three step requirements as set out for administrative
subpoenas under 12 U.S.C. § 3405.
0 12 U.S. C. § 3408-Formalwritten request.

This section allows for the federal government to file a
formal written request for the financial records, if it cannot obtain
382.
383.
334.
385.
386.

Id § 3404(a).
Id- § 3404(b).
Id. § 3405; The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3410 (200).
12 U.S.C. § 3406(a) (2000).
Id. § 3406(b)-(c).
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an administrative or judicial subpoena. The request must be
authorized by the particular agency's regulations, and the request
must be based on a "reason to believe that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry. 3 87 A copy of the
request must be sent to the customer who can contest the
dissemination of the records, but only if the customer files a
motion with the court swearing that the records are not relevant to
the stated legitimate law enforcement inquiry or setting forth other
legal objections. 88
* 12 U.S. C. § 3409-Delayednotice.
This section allows for a court sanctioned delay in the
procedures for providing notice to the customer.
° 12 U.S.C. § 3412-Use of information.
This section allows for the agency receiving information
pursuant to the RFPA to transfer it to another agency upon
certifying in writing that there is reason to believe that the records
are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry by the
receiving agency.38 9 If such a transfer is made, however, a formal
notification has to be made to the customer within 14 days, unless
a delay is sanctioned by a court.3 9
This section, however, specifically allows for transfers,
without notification to the customer, of information between
supervisory agencies, defined to mean the banking regulatory
agencies, the SEC, the CFTC and, with regard to BSA related
matters, the Department of the Treasury. In addition, the section
allows for a transfer, without notification to the customer, of
financial records from any agency to the Department of Justice or
to the Department of the Treasury if the transferring agency
certifies that there is reason to believe that the records may be
relevant to a violation of federal criminal law and the records were

387. Id. § 3408(a)(3).
388. The Fifth Amendment concerns that such a requirement might raise are
beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted that the procedure for customer
challenges under 12 U.S.C. § 3410 is similar.
389. Id. § 3412(a).
390. Id. § 3412(b).
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obtained by the agency in the exercise of its supervisory or
regulatory functions."'
12 U.S.C. § 3413-Exceptions.
This section provides the following very crucial exceptions
to the scope of the RFPA:
El Access to financial records by the banking
regulatory agencies. 92
Disclosure of financial records under the tax
code (Title 26).'
o3 Disclosure of financial records pursuant to
any federal statute or regulation. '
Disclosure
of financial
records
in
administrative, civil or criminal cases in
which the government and the customer are
both parties.3"'
[] Disclosure of the name, address, account
number and type of account for a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry in connection with a
financial transaction or class of financial
transactions or in connection with a foreign
country where the government is exercising
financial controls over foreign accounts
relating to that country.3%
E3
Disclosure of financial records pursuant to a
grand jury subpoena. 3"
Disclosure of financial records to the
General Accounting Office in connection
with an inquiry directed at a government
3 93
entity.

391 Id. § 3412(f).
392- Id. § 3413(b).

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id. § 3413(c).
12 U.S.C. § 3413(d) (2000).
Id § 3413(e).
Id. § 3413(g).
Id. § 3413(i).

398. Id. § 34130).
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Disclosure of financial records of an
employee, officer or director of any financial
institution or any major customer acting in
concert with such an individual in connection
with any possible crime against the financial
institution or a violation of the BSA.39
12 U.S.C. § 3414-Specialprocedures.
This section provides for
exceptions to the RFPA:

the following

additional

" Disclosure of financial records to a
government agency authorized to conduct
foreign intelligence
or counter intelligence
activities."°
" Disclosure of financial records to a
government agency authorized to conduct
investigations or intelligence or counterintelligence analysis related to international
terrorism.4 '
While these sections of the RFPA are very extensive, they at
least set out with precision when and how a financial institution
can hand records over to the federal government. However, the
Act has historically been controversial among the banking
regulatory and law enforcement agencies that have primarily
criticized the customer notification provisions of the Act: 2
It is very difficult to quantify the effect to which the
RFPA has actually impeded an investigation or to
what extent a lack of information influenced a
decision to not pursue a case. We do know,
however, that the limitations, actual or perceived,
399. Id.§ 3413(l).
400. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(1)(A) (2000).
401. This provision was added by § 358 of the Patriot Act. See Patriot Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 358 (2001).
402. Sarah Elizabeth Jones, Right to Financial Privacy: Emerging Standards of
Bank Compliance, 105 BANKING L.J. 37, 43-44 (1988).
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have unreasonably hindered full cooperation among
and between the banking agencies and the law
enforcement community. The Justice Financial
Institutions Regulatory Working Group in the final
Agreement of April 2, 1985, unanimously concluded
that restraints like the RFPA should be modified if
the Government is to coordinate effectively its
efforts in its battle against all types of crime. We
have long maintained that these limitations could be
significantly relaxed without any significant invasion
into privacy rights ... "
However, since the time of this testimony, various
amendments were made to the RFPA, including the exception in
12 U.S.C. § 3412(f) allowiing for transfer of documents to the
Department of Justice and to the Department of Treasury without
notification to the customer, and the exception in 12 U.S.C.

§ 3413(1) allowing for the production of documents pertaining to
an insider suspected of engaging in a crime against the financial
institution or engaging in money laundering.
The primary effect of the RFPA was to prohibit the

informal transfer of bank records to law enforcement agencies that
was complained about in Burrows "tand Suburban,4 ' but was
permitted in Chapman0 6 and Miller.' 7 While compliance with
requirements under the RFPA for formal requests and written
certifications can be cumbersome and occasionally unwieldy and
time-consuming, it provides certainty to the banks and a degree of
protection to the customer. In addition, the various exceptions
that have been factored into the RFPA, including the exceptions
for transferring documents to the Department of Justice and the
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Department of Treasury without notification to the customer; 4 8
responding to grand jury subpoenas without notification to the
customer; 409 and allowing for the transfer of documentation
pertaining to bank insiders without notification,4 0 all facilitate the
proper and necessary flow of information to law enforcement
agencies while still imposing restrictions that protect the interests
of the customer. In addition, the primary method of providing
appropriate information to law enforcement agencies-through
the filing of a formal SAR-is protected under the RFPA and does
not require notification to the customer.4
XII. CONCLUSION

While the issue of privacy rights is a sensitive and
controversial topic, the legislature, with the support of most of the
recent court cases, has made a good effort to establish an
appropriate balance between privacy rights-as set forth primarily
in the RFPA-and the need for strong and effective anti-money
laundering enforcement efforts-through the BSA and the various
exceptions to the RFPA. However, this is a developing and
changing area. The Patriot Act, for instance, as a new piece of
legislation, reflects the changing environment, clearly affecting the
dynamics of the area, but not drastically altering individuals'
privacy rights.
As Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis said over 100
years ago:
That the individual shall have full protection in
person and in property is a principle as old as the
common law; but it has been found necessary from
time to time to define anew the exact nature and
extent of such protection. Political, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new
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rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society.41 2
The extent of privacy rights has changed considerably since
the early cases, as reflected by such cases as Ohnstead.413 In
addition, the statutory landscape, with such pieces of legislation as
the BSA and the RFPA (which themselves have been amended
and altered a number of times), is reflective of the developments
and changes over time.
It is also reflective of the continuing tension in this area.
The banldng agencies' "Know Your Customer" (KYC) proposal,
issued on December 7, 1998414 and withdrawn on March 29-30,

1999,4 11 underscored this tension.41b
Even though some
commentators have noted that the "public opposition [to the
proposed regulation] probably was an overreaction," ' 7 it is clear
that the tensions and concerns exist.

These tensions and concerns resulted in a rejection of the
agencies' proposed KYC regulation three years ago.41" However,
recent events and further analysis resulted in the passage of the

Patriot Act, which requires regulations setting forth procedures for
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verifying the identity of customers seeking to open accounts at
banks.41 9 While the Patriot Act does not require regulations that
are as extensive as the proposed KYC regulation4 2°--in that the
Patriot Act regulations are not designed to address on-going
review or monitoring of accounts 42 -the requirement to ensure
"reasonable procedures" for verifying the identity of customers
opening accounts 422 is a strong statement of the need for banks to
verify, or know, the identity of their customers. It is also a strong
reflection of the changes that can, and mostly will continue to,
occur in this area.
While the Patriot Act and the international guidance set
forth above reflect the need for continued changes and for
strengthening anti-money laundering efforts, especially in the area
of account identification procedures and in curtailing risks relating
to certain high profile accounts and transactions, the true extent of
what the public, the courts, and the legislature will deem to be an
acceptable balance will continue to evolve.
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